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Richard Labunski*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certio-
rari it had granted in United States v. Providence Journal Co.,' the
Court lost its only opportunity thus far to establish national standards
for the "collateral bar" rule in First Amendment cases involving media
organizations.2 The Court could have used Providence to decide no less
an issue than when First Amendment rights transcend the power of
courts to punish criminally contemptuous behavior To judges, the
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1975; M.A., 1977; Ph.D., 1979 (political science), University of California; J.D., Univer-
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1. 485 U.S. 693 (1988). After the case was briefed and argued, the Court dis-
missed the writ upon learning that the special counsel appointed to prosecute the
contempt charge against the newspaper and its editor failed to secure the proper
authorization from the Solicitor General to allow him to represent the Federal govern-
ment before the Supreme Court as required by 28 U.S.C. § 518(a). Id. at 699-700.
2. Providence would have been the first major Supreme Court decision on the
collateral bar rule for First Amendment cases, involving either media or non-media
defendants, in more than a quarter of a century. See Walker v. City of Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307, 315, 320 (1967) (holding that civil rights demonstrators who violated an
order enjoining them from participating in a parade without a permit could not col-
laterally attack the original order while appealing the contempt conviction).
3. At common law, courts enjoyed an inherent power of contempt. See, e.g.,
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911) (finding that courts
have inherent contempt authority); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510
(1873) (recognizing the court's inherent power of contempt); Anderson v. Dunn, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat) 204, 227 (1821) (stating that courts are vested with "power to impose
silence, respect and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful man-
collateral bar rule is essential if courts are to function as a viable third
branch of government. To proponents of the First Amendment, the rule
allows courts to use the awesome power of contempt to punish disobe-
dience of orders that the judge knew or should have known were un-
constitutional when issued.
The collateral bar rule holds that a party who disobeys a judicial
order may not "collaterally" challenge the validity of the original order
when appealing a criminal contempt conviction.' Under the rule, the
dates"); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (holding that con-
tempt is a power "necessary to the exercise of all others"). The contempt power of
federal courts has been limited by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). One judge
observed that
contempt may well be the last vestige of the so-called 'common law crimes,'
insofar as a determination that particular conduct should be punished as
contempt depends not so much on specific prohibited acts having occurred
as on the Judge's subjective determination that the conduct was culpable,
blameworthy and deserving of punishment.
United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 513 (5th Cir. 1972).
4. Judges assert that orders that curtail First Amendment rights are issued in
good faith, and that no litigant knows in advance whether such an order will survive
on appeal. Judge West's comment in United States v. Dickinson, 349 F. Supp. 227
(M.D. La. 1972), to be discussed infra, represents the view that judges do not issue
such orders frivolously: "Of course this Court was of the opinion that its order was a
valid one. It would be difficult to conceive of a court issuing an order, knowing it to
be invalid, and then having the audacity to cite a person for contempt for disobeying
it" Id. at 229. In Dickinson, Judge West reinstated a contempt conviction against two
newspaper reporters even after the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared the under-
lying order to be unconstitutional. Id. at 228-29. The Fifth Circuit upheld Judge
West's reimposition of the contempt punishment. United States v. Dickinson, 476 F.2d
373 (5th Cir. 1973). However, Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers Inc., 365 N.E.2d 746
(ill. App. Ct 1977), undermines Judge West's statement since the trial judge first
convicted the newspaper and its publisher of contempt after the appellate court had
already determined that the underlying order was unconstitutional. Id. at 747.
5. For detailed discussion of the collateral bar rule in federal First Amendment
cases, see Walker, 388 U.S. 307; see also In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342
(1st Cir. 1986), modified en banc, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v.
CBS, 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1972); Ronald F. Chase, J.D., Annotation, Appealability of Contempt Adjudication or
Conviction, 33 A.LR.3d 448 (1970); Edward L Raymond, Jr., J.D., Annotation, Media's
Dissemination of Material in Violation of Injunction or Restraining Order as Con-
tempt - Federal Cases, 91 A.LR. FED. 270 (1989). For major state cases, see Ex
parte Purvis, 382 So.2d 512 (Ala. 1980); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 418
P.2d 594 (Ariz. 1966); State v. Chavez, 601 P.2d 301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); In re Ber-
ry, 436 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1968); Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 365 N.E.2d 746
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1993); State v. Coe, 679 P.2d
353 (Wash. 1984); State ex. rel. Super. Ct. v. Sperry, 483 P.2d 608 (Wash. 1971). The
collateral bar rule generally applies only to criminal contempt, but there is no clear
line between civil and criminal contempt. The same act in different situations may be
regarded as either civil or criminal. In International Union, United Mine Workers v.
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appeal of the contempt conviction is a separate cause of action, and
once a party disobeys the original order, he or she forfeits the right to
challenge its validity in any subsequent proceeding. The collateral bar
rule has the effect of upholding punishment even though the original
order was invalid or unconstitutional.' Judges argue that their function
would be merely advisory if parties could wantonly violate judicial or-
ders, and then challenge the original order while appealing the con-
tempt conviction.7
Several jurisdictions appear to impose the collateral bar rule in all
First Amendment cases, including those involving "pure speech."8 Some
states only apply the rule when there is "speech plus conduct," as in
labor demonstrations,' although one state permitted a collateral chal-
Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that a
$52,000,000 fine was punishment for criminal and not civil contempt, as previously
characterized by the Virginia Supreme Court. Therefore, the union was entitled to
trial by jury and all criminal procedures before having to pay the fine. Id. at 2563.
6. The difference between disobeying an injunction later determined to be invalid,
and a statute later deemed unconstitutional, is shown by comparing Walker and
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). Shuttlesworth involved
some of the defendants in Walker who were being prosecuted for violating the
antiparade statute. Id. at 157. Justice Stewart, who also authored the Walker opinion,
held in Shuttlesworth that the ordinance was clearly unconstitutional, and thus over-
turned the petitioners' convictions. Id. at 150-51. Shuttlesworth strongly suggested that
the injunction in Walker, which was based on the ordinance struck down in
Shuttlesworth, was also unconstitutional.
7. Collateral bar cases arising in contexts that only indirectly implicate First
Amendment interests are briefly discussed for illustrative purposes, but are largely
outside the scope of this Article. See infra note 15.
8. These jurisdictions include the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Alabama.
See supra note 5. "Pure speech" usually refers to the publication or broadcast of
information by a media organization, and involves a minimum of "conduct" such as
picketing or demonstrating.
9. The Supreme Court strongly endorsed the rule in several cases involving labor
disputes, including United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258 (1947),
where the Court held that. "Violations of an order are punishable as criminal con-
tempt even though the order is set aside on appeal." Id. at 294. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals cited the rule with approval in Latrobe Steel Co. v. United
Steelworkers of Am., 545 F.2d 1336 (3d Cir. 1976). "With regard to criminal contempt,
the Supreme Court's opinion in Walker v. Birmingham and United States v. United
Mine Workers clearly hold that a criminal contempt judgment does survive the void-
ing of any injunction." Id. at 1345 (footnotes omitted). Compare Phoenix Newspapers,
Inc. v. Superior Ct., 418 P.2d 594 (Ariz. 1966) (holding that an invalid order prohibit-
ing news organizations from writing about a preliminary hearing held in open court
cannot support a contempt conviction) with State v. Chavez, 601 P.2d 301 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that strikers could not collaterally challenge an injunction prohib-
lenge in a case involving substantial conduct and potential for vio-
lence.' o Other courts have upheld the rule when the speech is unpro-
tected, such as obscenity." Some jurisdictions strongly reject the rule
by holding that an invalid or unconstitutional order cannot support a
contempt conviction, 2 while others will overturn the contempt convic-
tion only if the original order had no "pretense to validity," 3 or was
"transparently invalid."4
iting picketing which they had disobeyed).
10. Ex Parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1993).
11. People v. Sequoia Books, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 50 (IIl. App. Ct. 1988) (upholding
contempt conviction even though part of the injunction was an unconstitutional prior
restraint), rev'd on other grounds, 537 N.E.2d 302 (Ill. 1989). The same court that
upheld the contempt conviction in Sequoia overturned a contempt conviction in Coo-
per v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc. 365 N.E.2d 746 (I11. App. Ct. 1977) (concluding that
an order compelling the newspaper not to publish information about a libel suit
which it was defending was an unconstitutional prior restraint, and allowing collateral
challenge of the order in contempt appeal).
12. See generally In re Berry, 436 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1968); State ex ret. Superior Ct.
v. Sperry, 483 P.2d 608 (Wash. 1971). In State v. Crenshaw, 764 P.2d 1372 (Or. 1988),
which was not a First Amendment case, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a con-
tempt conviction because it concluded the underlying order was valid, but stated that
especially in direct criminal contempt, where no writ of mandamus is available unless
the judge "as a matter of grace" allows a period of time to seek the writ, the court
will not impose the collateral bar rule. Id. at 1376.
13. The principle that such orders do not have to be obeyed first emerged in
Walker, where the Court stated: "And this is not a case where the injunction was
transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity." Walker, 388 U.S. at
315. In Walker, the Court upheld the criminal contempt convictions of civil rights
demonstrators who violated an ex parte order prohibiting them from marching on
Good Friday and Easter Sunday of 1963. Id. at 311, 321. The Supreme Court suggest-
ed that the underlying order was unconstitutional, but concluded that the demonstra-
tors had an obligation to appeal the original order before disobeying it. Id. at 320.
For a detailed examination of Walter, and criticism that the importance of the case
is not recognized in law schools, see David B. Oppenheimer, Martin Luther King,
Walker v. City of Birmingham, and the 'Letter from Birmingham Jail', 26 U.C.
DAvis L REv. 791 (1993).
14. In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1347 (1st Cir. 1986), modified en
bane, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987). In Providence, the order was "transparently inval-
id" because it "constituted a presumptively unconstitutional prior restraint on pure
speech by the press." Id. at 1353. The court did not clearly define at what point an
order is sufficiently defective that it can be disobeyed and then challenged while
appealing the contempt conviction. If, for example, a court issued an order against a
party over whom it lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction, it would be trans-
parently invalid. Moreover, the Providence court held that if an order is ex parte,
that would be a factor suggesting that the order was transparently invalid. Both the
Supreme Court in Walker, and the First Circuit in Providence, stressed that an uncon-
stitutional order is not automatically transparently invalid. To those courts, only a
"void" order which is transparently invalid, as opposed to a "voidable" order which
may be unconstitutional, can be Ignored. Id. at 1347. Instead of characterizing orders
as "transparently invalid," some courts have concluded that a court issuing the order
(Vol. 22: 405, 19951 "Collateral Bar" Rule
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Collateral bar cases also arise in the context of defiance of court
orders by attorneys. Some courts, including the Supreme Court, hold
that if obeying the order requires the irretrievable surrender of constitu-
tional rights, the attorney may advise a client to defy the order, then
challenge it while appealing the contempt conviction." Some states
nevertheless preclude lawyers from collaterally challenging the order
when appealing a contempt conviction if they disregard an order" or
advise their client to defy an order that is not transparently invalid.
Judges have substantial discretion to control proceedings before
them. One federal court upheld a contempt conviction of a nonparty
even though the trial court exceeded its inherent power to issue an
order compelling attendance of the non-party at a settlement confer-
ence. Other states have strongly supported the collateral bar rule in
lacked jurisdiction to take such action, and disobeying a court order with jurisdiction-
al defects is less threatening to judicial authority than defying an order that may be
unconstitutional, but which a court had jurisdiction to issue.
15. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975). Maness involved an order for the pro-
duction of allegedly obscene materials which was challenged on self-incrimination
grounds. Id. at 450-52. Although counsel advised his client to disobey the order, the
Supreme Court overturned the contempt conviction of the attorney, concluding that
"when a court during trial orders a witness to reveal information . . . compliance
could cause irreparable injury because appellate courts cannot always 'unring the bell'
once the information has been released. Subsequent appellate vindication does not
necessarily have its ordinary consequence of totally repairing the error." Id. at 460.
The Court added that although such an order can be resisted and challenged on
appeal, if the original order is upheld, the contempt conviction stands. Id. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971).
. 16. In re Balter, 468 N.E.2d 688, 689 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that attorney who be-
lieved that conflict of interest prevented ethical representation of client, and there-
fore, defied order to proceed to trial, was properly convicted of contempt even
though underlying order was erroneous).
17. In re Reeves, 733 P.2d 795, 802 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (holding that lawyer
who advised client to disobey order telling her not to "interfere" with husband's cus-
tody of child cannot collaterally challenge the order in the contempt appeal).
18. In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1409 (11th Cir. 1991). The non-party was an insur-
ance executive in Illinois with authority to approve settlements, but the trial court
issuing the order was in Georgia Id. at 1399. The court of appeals held that the trial
court had inherent authority to compel the parties in the case to produce those with
settlement authority, but lacked inherent power to directly order a non-party from
another state to appear. Id. at 1407-08. Nevertheless, the court of appeals decided
that the non-party should have asked the court to modify its order, and should not
have disobeyed it. Id. at 1409. It upheld the contempt conviction and $500 fine. Id.
at 1400. That courts take seriously their ability to punish disobedience of even invalid
orders is demonstrated by the court in Novak: "Therefore, Novak suffers no unfair
principle, but in particular cases, found on narrow grounds that the
contempt conviction must be reversed when the original order was held
to be invalid." Other states have rejected the rule in non-First Amend-
ment contexts.20
When the power of courts to punish disobedience of their orders and
the rights protected by the First Amendment clash, no easy solution
emerges. The First Amendment has long enjoyed a "preferred position"
under the federal constitution,2 and vigorous protection of speech and
press is essential to a democratic society." On the other hand, courts
could not function if their orders were routinely disobeyed.' Although
the contempt power can be abused, judges themselves frequently
comment that it is to be used "sparingly."' In addition, if the contempt
punishment is severe, courts require that those subject to such sanc-
tions be afforded due process rights."
hardship by our application of the collateral bar rule in his case; it was his failure to
properly challenge the district court's order and his subsequent disobedience of that
order-not any failing of the judicial system-that resulted in his contempt convic-
tion." Id. at 1402. See also United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mo-
bilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988) (holding that "a nonparty witness can challenge
the [trial] court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in defense of a civil contempt
citation, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment in the underlying action").
19. Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 496 A.2d 476, 485 (Conn. 1985) (overturning
contempt conviction because of lack of trial and showing of sufficient evidence, but
strongly supporting collateral bar rule in principle).
20. In re Wharton, 290 S.E.2d 688, 693 (N.C. 1982) (holding that the court had no
authority to issue an order requiring the county department of social services to
establish a foster home for juveniles and overturning the contempt conviction); see
also Ex parte Olivares, 662 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex. 1983) (reversing a contempt con-
viction because the court lacked jurisdiction to issue a written order after previously
issuing an oral order of dismissal).
21. A footnote by Justice Stone is thought to be the origin of the "preferred posi-
tion" theory. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
22. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (finding that presumption sup-
porting legislation must be weighed against preference given to freedoms of the First
Amendment); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (holding that it is
irrelevant that an ordinance is nondiscriminatory because First Amendment rights
stand in a preferred position and cannot be easily restricted); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (stating that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist" with-
out freedom of thought and speech).
23. See United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972). Judge Brown
noted that unlike defiance of an unconstitutional statute which does not interfere
with the functioning of the legislature, refusal to obey a court order undermines judi-
cial authority by requiring further action by the judiciary and, therefore, 'directly
affects the judiciary's ability to discharge its duties and responsibilities." Id. at 510.
24. See infra notes 88-138 and accompanying text.
25. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911); see also Yates
v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1958); Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399,
403 (1956); In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611, 616 (9th Cir. 1965).
26. For "serious" criminal contempts involving imprisonment of more than six
[Vol. 22: 405, 1995] "Collateral Bar" Rule
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The conflict is especially acute when judges issue orders in a free
press/fair trial context. When judges are concerned about prejudicial
publicity that interferes with the defendant's right to a fair trial, they
may issue orders against either the trial participants, or news reporters
covering the proceedings, or both. Those orders frequently tell partic-
ipants they may not discuss the case, and prohibit the news media from
publishing or broadcasting information that would make impaneling an
impartial jury more difficult, or if the trial has already begun, informa-
tion that jurors would not hear in open court.' A defendant may be on
trial for a serious offense, and judges believe that imposing restraining
or "gag" orders against the press is necessary to protect the rights un-
der the Sixth Amendment in some circumstances.'
months, the protections include the right to jury trial. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,
198-99 (1968). The requirement that a contempt defendant receive a jury trial if the
sentence is potentially more than six months even includes direct criminal contempt,
which takes place in the presence of the judge, and where appellate courts grant
judges maximum discretion to summarily punish contemptuous behavior. On the other
hand, "petty" contempt, like other petty criminal offenses, may be tried without a
jury. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495 (1974). The Supreme Court has not yet deter-
mined how large a fine constitutes a serious criminal sanction that requires trial by
jury. In Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), the Court held that a fine of $10,000
imposed on a union was insufficient to.trigger the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial. Id. at 477. In International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct
2552 (1994), the Court found that a $62,000,000 fine (later reduced to $52,000,000)
was "unquestionably a serious contempt sanction" which required a jury trial. Id. at
2562.
27. The landmark Supreme Court case involving a "gag order" against the press
was Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), in which the Court invalidat-
ed an order prohibiting the press from publishing information about a defendant in a
mass murder case. Id. at 570. Attorneys may face criminal contempt charges for ex-
trajudicial statements. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). In addition
to imposing contempt punishment, some courts have barred reporters from further at-
tendance at the trial after they violated a court order. See generally Oliver v. Postel,
282 N.E.2d 306 (N.Y. 1972); Superior Ct. v. Sperry, 483 P.2d 608, 611 (Wash. 1971).
28. In United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972), a federal district
court judge was concerned that publicity about the federal court hearing would make
it difficult to impanel an impartial jury in the state prosecution. The Fifth Circuit
invalidated the order as a violation of the First Amendment, although it recognized
the efforts of the trial judge to a secure a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment. Id.
at 501.
29. In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 332 (N.J. 1978). Farber is a classic example of the
clash between the Sixth and First Amendments. Dr. Mario Jascalevich was tried for
the deaths of several patients in the New Jersey hospital where he worked. Id.
Myron Farber, a New York Times reporter, refused to identify the names of confiden-
tial sources who provided information for a series of articles he wrote about the
The Supreme Court, however, has made it very unlikely that such an
order against the press will be upheld on appeal. The Court has long
recognized the First Amendment's intolerance for "prior restraint,"'
and in the free press/fair trial context, the Court has established a
three-part test that is extremely difficult for judges to meet.' Journal-
deaths, although he testified at trial on other aspects of the case. Id. In rejecting
Farber's argument that the New Jersey and Federal Constitutions, and the New Jersey
Shield Law, provided a privilege to keep the names of sources confidential, the New
Jersey courts upheld the civil contempt convictions of Farber and the newspaper,
which paid several hundred thousand dollars in fines. Id. at 339. The case was some-
what unusual because the defense, rather than the prosecution, sought the informa-
tion. It claimed that the defendant, who was later acquitted, could not receive a fair
trial without it. Id. at 332. Farber spent 40 days in jail, and the New York Times
paid $286,000 in fines. Both Farber and the newspaper were later pardoned by Gover-
nor Byrne, and the fines were partially refunded. See Jonathan Friendly, Times and
Reporter Granted Byrne Pardon in 'Dr. X" Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1982, at Al. See
generally M. FARBER, SOMEBODY IS LYING (1982) (recounting Farber's experience with
the "Dr. X" murder trial).
30. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (concluding that the statute
which authorized public officials to bring publishers of "malicious, scandalous, and
defamatory" periodicals before a judge to prove the material is true and published in
good faith was an unconstitutional restraint of freedom of expression); Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (finding the government has a
heavy burden to justify the restraint of speech); New York Times v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 713 (1971) (per curiam) (finding that government did not carry the
heavy burden required to support prior restraint on newspaper's publication of classi-
fied material regarding government's Vietnam policy). But see United States v. Pro-
gressive, 467 F. Supp. 990, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (issuing restraining order enjoining
publication of restrictive data detailing a method for the construction of a hydrogen
bomb because vital national security interests outweighed the constitutional doctrine
against prior restraint). In an action that some view as the Supreme Court's approval
of a prior restraint on pure speech, the Court, on November 18, 1990, by a 7-2 vote,
refused to lift a Federal district judge's order that barred the Cable News Network
• (CNN) from broadcasting telephone conversations between General Manuel Noriega
and his legal defense team. Linda Greenhouse, Ban on Noriega Tape Telecast Contin-
ues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1990, at A14.
31. The test established in Nebraska Press Association requires: 1) a finding of
pervasive publicity affecting jurors; 2) a finding that there are no alternative methods
available to the court other than issuance of a prior restraint on the press; and 3) a
finding that the prior restraint will be effective. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at
562-67. See James C. Goodale, The Press Ungagged The Practical Ffect on Gag Or-
der Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STANFORD L REV. 497
(1977) (arguing that if the substantial publicity surrounding the murders in Nebraska
Press Association did not justify prior restraint order, it would be difficult to imagine
a case that would). In CBS v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912 (1994) (application for stay),
Justice Blackmun, as a circuit justice, overturned an injunction issued by a South
Dakota state judge that would have prohibited the network from airing videotape
taken at a beef processing plant. Id. at 915. Justice Blackmun issued the stay, citing
traditional First Amendment rejection of prior restraint, on February 9, 1994, hours
before the program aired. Id. at 912. .
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ists vigorously argue that because a prior restraint order is likely to be
invalidated on appeal, one may violate the order and challenge its valid-
ity while appealing a contempt conviction.' Judges assert that their
orders are made in good faith, and no litigant knows in advance
whether the order will be overturned. Moreover, they argue that the
authority of the court is at stake, and no litigant should be a "judge in
his own case."' They further argue that if there is conduct as well as
pure speech involved, their orders, such as limiting picketing, will more
likely be upheld on appeal.'
Traditional First Amendment jurisprudence has focused on the rights
of the speaker to communicate in a self-governing society.' Although
efforts to protect the dissemination of information have been successful
in most First Amendment contexts,' judges and commentators have
observed that the First Amendment is just one provision of the Con-
stitution, and that other rights must also be strongly enforced.' Courts
32. The collateral bar cases obviously arise because the underlying order was held
to be unconstitutional. If it is valid, the court would uphold the contempt judgment
and the journalists would not mount a collateral challenge. Although judges issuing
the orders may strongly believe in their validity, appellate courts have sometimes
characterized those orders as "constitutionally overbroad," "transparently invalid," and
.patentiy frivolous."
33. In language repeated in many subsequent cases, Justice Stewart wrote:. "[N]o
man can be judge in his own case, however exalted his station, however righteous
his motives." Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967).
34. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 289 (1947) (holding
that one who willfully disobeys a court order is subject to a criminal contempt or-
der); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922) (holding that an order issuing out
of a court with subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the parties must be
obeyed even if later overturned).
35. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941);
LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Vincent Blasi, The Checking
Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977) (examining
the sources and premises of the notion that freedom of expression has value partly
because it has the function of checking the abuse of official power); Robert Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971) (ex-
amining neutral principles and their application to important and debated problems in
the interpretation of the First Amendment).
36. The Supreme Court has long held that certainly narrowly defined classes of
speech are not entitled to First Amendment protection. They include the "lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
37. For a critical view of In re Providence Journal Co. by one of the First
must be able to protect the rights of litigants and to vindicate challeng-
es to their authority by punishing contemptuous behavior.
Those subject to an order later determined to be unconstitutional
face limited options. If they comply with the order, then appeal, the
news value of the information or timeliness of the expression may be
lost during the months it takes for an appellate court to make a deci-
sion.' A delay may be the equivalent of forfeiting rights under the First
Amendment to which the publisher or broadcaster was entitled.'
The restrained party may attempt to have the issuing court modify
the order or have the order overturned on appeal on an expedited ba-
sis.' If the decision does not come when the information is still timely,
they can disobey the order and hope that the jurisdiction allows a col-
lateral challenge to the underlying order.4 If, however, they disobey
the order in a jurisdiction that upholds the collateral bar rule, they lose
the right to challenge the validity of the original order and may be sub-
ject to serious contempt sanctions."
There are situations in which the collateral bar rule has been held
inapplicable. First, if the issuing court lacks subject matter or personal
Amendment's most articulate proponents, see Anthony Lewis, The Civilizing Hand,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1986, at A27.
38. The court in In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986), rec-
ognized the importance of deadlines in news coverage: "[I]t is misleading in the con-
text of daily newspaper publishing to argue that a temporary restraining order merely
preserves the status quo. The status quo of daily newspapers is to publish news
promptly that editors decide to publish." Id. at 1351. Justice Brennan, dissenting in
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), observed that the civil rights
demonstrators needed to march on Good Friday and Easter Sunday to generate pub-
licity for their cause. Id. at 349.
39. In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d at 1352 n.71.
40. Many jurisdictions do not have emergency appellate procedures that provide
immediate review in First Amendment cases. In Providence, the newspaper argued
that others were about to publish the information that the FBI had made available,
and it, therefore, had to publish immediately. There may be emergency procedures to
rescue attorneys jailed for direct criminal contempt by judges angry that they did not
submit material in advance of publication for court approval. In Goldblumn v. National
Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1978), the attorney refused to make available
to the judge an NBC documentary scheduled for national broadcast that evening. Id.
at 906. The lawyer was in jail for about half a day before the Ninth Circuit granted
emergency relief. Id.
41. The Supreme Court stated in WaLker that it may have decided the case differ-
ently if the defendants had made any effort to appeal the injunction in the two days
before the march. 388 U.S. at 318-19.
42. In Providence, 820 F.2d at 1354, the en banc court modified the three-judge
panel decision by urging publishers to appeal orders before disobeying them whenev-
er time permits. Id. at 1355. The Fifth Circuit observed in United States v. Dickinson,
465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972), that "newsmen are citizens, too .... They too may
sometimes have to wait." Id. at 512.
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jurisdiction, its order may be violated and challenged in the contempt
appeal. 4' Second, the rule presumes that adequate remedies exist for
orderly review of the challenged ruling. If there is no such opportunity
for review, the contemnor may challenge the validity of the original
order while appealing the contempt conviction." Finally, court orders
that are transparently invalid or patently frivolous need not be
obeyed."5
Traditional debate over the collateral bar rule centers on the rights of
speakers versus the power of courts. Relatively recent and subtle First
Amendment developments suggest, however, that not only the rights of
the media or demonstrators are involved in freedom of speech and
press cases, but also the right of readers, listeners and viewers to re-
ceive information.' Although tentatively embraced by the Supreme
Court and lower courts, the principle that the "governors" in a demo-
cratic society enjoy First Amendment rights to receive relevant informa-
tion potentially adds significant weight to the free expression side of
the scales. If there is a right to receive information, then a judge who
issues a restraining order not only interferes with the First Amendment
rights of the speaker, but also interferes with the essential access that
43. See In re Green, 369 U.S. 689, 692 (1962) (holding that a court could not
know whether it was within bounds for citing a person for contempt for violating the
injunction without a hearing); In re Hem Iron Works, 881 F. 2d 722, 726-27 (9th Cir.
1989) ("In such a case, the original order is deemed a nullity, and the accused con-
temnor cannot be fairly punished for violating nothing at all."); United States v.
Dickinson, 465 F.2d '496, 511 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that unconstitutional orders that
must be obeyed presupposes subject matter and personal jurisdiction).
44. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 511.
45. Id. at 509; see also In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d at 1347 (recognizing
an exception to the collateral bar rule for transparently invalid orders).
46. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which adopted
Meiklejohn's "citizen as ruler" view of the First Amendment, the Court suggested a
constitutional right to receive information. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 263-65 (1961); see also First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) ("[Tlhe expression of views on an issue of pub-
lic Importance is at the heart of First Amendment concerns."); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (finding that re-
cipients of information are entitled to bring First Amendment suits); Red Lion Broad-
casting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (giving the FCC authority to mandate that all
broadcasters operate in the public interest); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (holding that door to door distribution of religious material is constitutionally
protected). See also Rene L Todd, A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judi-
cial Response to Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial Participants, 88
MICH. L REV. 1171 (1990).
the public needs to monitor the activities of courts and other institu-
tions of government."7 If a right of access to information is added to
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence that already provides sub-
stantial protection to the speaker, the argument that First Amendment
rights transcend the ability of courts to enforce unconstitutional orders
becomes more compelling. Those who -disobey such orders still risk
contempt conviction if the underlying order is later upheld. On the
other hand, if the collateral bar rule is rejected, they cannot be pun-
ished for violating an unconstitutional order.
The complex issue of whether important First Amendment principles
should be subject to state-by-state development must also be addressed.
The Supreme Court created national standards in First Amendment
cases from which it will allow little, if any, state deviation, ' but has
also recognized that states enjoy substantial autonomy to develop their
own First Amendment standards, especially if based on free expression
provisions of state constitutions. Accepting that there should not be
47. No modem case has generated more pretrial publicity than the murder trial of
former football star O.J. Simpson. From his arrest, covered live by helicopters hov-
ering overhead beaming pictures to television sets all over the world, to the
gavel-to-gavel coverage of the preliminary hearing, the public has learned much about
the role of grand juries, the function of a preliminary hearing, the requirements under
the Fourth Amendment, and other aspects of the judicial process. See generally, 95
Million Watched the Chase, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1994, at A12; Michiko Kakutani, Why
We Still Can't Stop Watching O.J. on TV, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1994, at sec. 4, p. 10;
Bill Carter, Networks' Simpson Vigil A Low-Cost Reply to CNN, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
1994, at DI. On October 20, 1994, Judge Lance Ito, the judge presiding at the
Simpson trial, barred the media and the public from the courtroom while prospective
jurors were questioned about the potential prejudicial effects of a newly-published
book. Kenneth B. Noble, Judge Restricts Simpson Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1994, at Al. The judge reversed the order the next day, allowing a pool of reporters
and the public to attend the continued questioning of potential jurors. Id.
48. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86, the Court first national-
ized defamation standards in media cases by holding that a public official must dem-
onstrate "actual malice" with "convincing clarity" (as opposed to preponderance of
the evidence) to win a judgment against a media defendant. The Court extended such
protection to media discussion of public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, and
Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 132 (1967) (decided together). The Court
insists that federal and state courts require that actual malice be demonstrated when
the libel plaintiff is a public official or public figure. New York Times, 376 U.S. at
285-86. However, in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court held
that as long as the states do not allow liability without fault, they may decide for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability in media cases involving private per-
sons. Id. at 347. Although most states have chosen a negligence standard, see gener-
ally Taskett v. King Broadcasting, 546 P.2d 81 (Wash. 1976) (holding that private
persons must demonstrate a lack of "reasonable care" on the part of the media de-
fendant, but not actual malice), several states retain the actual malice standard for
private person libel plaintiffs.
49. In Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Court held that
[Vol. 22: 405, 1995] "Collateral Bar" Rule
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
complete federal preemption in the First Amendment area, it is never-
theless difficult to justify the variable interpretation given free expres-
sion rights in different jurisdictions. The First Amendment clearly does
not have the same meaning in Washington and Alabama, or in the First
and Fifth Circuits.' National news organizations, which are subject to
court jurisdiction anywhere they publish or broadcast,"' should not be
exposed to widely varying punishments for disobeying unconstitutional
orders. Where the order is issued largely determines whether the First
Amendment rights to which journalists and others are entitled will be
chilled, or even frozen, while they calculate the risks of violating a
seemingly unconstitutional order.'
Because of long-cherished principles of federalism, and the fact that
many federal judges do not think it is their responsibility to tell state
judges how to run their courtrooms and judicial systems,' national
collateral bar rule standards in First Amendment cases will be resisted.
Nevertheless, with so much at stake, it is important for the Supreme
Court to establish minimum national standards to balance the power
and legitimacy of courts with protections granted under the First
Amendment.
states may provide through their own constitutions more First Amendment protection
than is required by the United States Constitution. Id. at 81 (citing Cooper v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)).
50. Washington, for example, largely rejected the collateral bar rule in Sperry and
Coe, while Alabama applied it in Purvis. See supra note 5. The First and Fifth Cir-
cuits have come to opposite conclusions on the rule in First Amendment cases in
Providence and Dickinson, respectively.
51. See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (holding jurisdiction was proper where conduct took place
and publication was distributed).
52. See, e.g., In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d 1342, 1351-52 (1st Cir. 1986). Ap-
pellate courts in many states have not decided First Amendment collateral bar rule
cases.
53. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51-53 (1971) (finding that absent ex-
traordinary circumstances, the federal courts will not enjoin pending state criminal
prosecutions); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (holding that
when a state provides an opportunity for litigation, habeas corpus on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds is not required).
54. The tension between the press and courts over how to deal with a potentially
invalid order is aggravated by some journalists who proudly proclaim their defiance
while publishing the information subject to the order. See Dickinson, 349 F. Supp. at
228-29; see also Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1345. The irony is that journalists
ultimately depend on the judiciary for vigorous enforcement of their rights in the
face of legislative and executive action that interfere with freedom of expression.
This Article argues that when the Court next has the chance to estab-
lish national standards, it should reaffirm the near-sacred protections
granted under the First Amendment, and hold that the collateral bar
rule should not apply in cases absent a showing of imminent vio-
lence," or a substantial likelihood of severe interference with essential
public services.' Issues that the Court should consider are discussed,
and suggestions are made to resolve the conflict between the collateral
bar rule and the First Amendment.
II. THE CONTEMPT POWER OF COURTS
A. Civil and Criminal Contempt
Because only criminal contempt survives the invalidation of the origi-
nal order in jurisdictions that enforce the collateral bar rule, courts and
parties must recognize the nature of the contemptuous behavior and
the penalty." It is often difficult, however, to determine whether the
case involved civil or criminal contempt.' In general, civil contempt is
intended to force compliance with a judge's order and protect the rights
of one of the litigants. The penalty is indeterminate in nature, and it is
often said that the contemnor "holds the key to his own jail cell. "'
55. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
56. In Ex parte Purvis, 382 So. 2d 512 (Ala. 1980), the trial court enjoined the
continuation of a strike that it believed could disrupt the city's water service. Id. at
515. The union leader defied the order by not telling his members to return to their
jobs. Id. at 514. The state supreme court held that he could not collaterally challenge
the original order in the contempt appeal since the order was not transparently inval-
id or frivolous. Id.
57. In United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), the Supreme
Court observed: "The right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events
prove was erroneously issued." Id. at 295.
58. The Supreme Court noted in International Union, United Mine Workers v.
Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994), that commentators and courts have often disagreed
as to the distinguishing characteristics of civil and criminal contempt. Id. at 2557. See
generally Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L REv. 183
(1971); Earl C. Dudley, Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Ap-
proach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REv. 1025 (1993); Luis
Kutner, Contempt Power: The Black Robe - A Proposal for Due Process, 39 TENN. L
REV. 1 (1971); Robert J. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion
Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L REv. 677 (1981).
59. Once it becomes clear that a jailed contemnor is not likely to comply, the
punishment becomes punitive and not coercive, and must be vacated. Catena v.
Seidel, 343 A.2d 744 (N.J. 1975) (holding that mob figure who was granted immunity,
but who nevertheless refused to answer questions about mob activities, and who
remained in jail for five years, must be released because of no substantial likelihood
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Criminal contempt, on the other hand, primarily punishes disobedience
of a judicial order and vindicates the court's authority.' However, in
some instances, the same contemptuous behavior can be both civil and
criminal."'
Determining the difference is necessary because if the punishment is
criminal, the contemnor is entitled to procedural rights.' The burden
of proof is on the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt, and there is protection against self-incrimination.' The contem-
nor enjoys double jeopardy protection,' may be entitled to appointed
counsel, and will have compulsory process for witnesses.' Similar to
other crimes, intent is an essential element to be proven.' If the crimi-
nal sentence is serious, the contemnor will be entitled to a jury trial.7
In some jurisdictions, contempt proceedings must begin with an indict-
ment or information.' Civil contempt, on the other hand, is coercive in
of compliance). A federal witness who refuses to testify can be held no more than
18 months, even in coercive contempt and even if the testimony is still needed. 28
U.S.C. §1826 (1970). See Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983).
60. LaTrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 545 F.2d 1336, 1345 (3d Cir.
1976); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
61. A court, after assessing a per diem fine, for example, can also punish by crim-
inal contempt the same behavior that led to the civil contempt charge. For example,
in In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 332 (N.J. 1978), Farber was incarcerated and the New
York Times was fined on a daily basis for civil contempt The civil contempt action
was to force Farber to reveal the names of confidential sources. Id. The court also
summarily held Farber in criminal contempt and sentenced him to six months in jail,
to be served following the end of the civil contempt. Id. When the trial was over,
however, the judge relented and dismissed the criminal contempt conviction. See In
re Timmons, 607 F.2d 120, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding, that civil contempt may be
lifted when the disobedience ends, but criminal contempt is punitive and lasts for a
fixed period).
62. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632 (1988).
63. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911).
64. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
65. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
66. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947). "Willfulness" is
an essential element of criminal contempt. Id.
67. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 199 (1968); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495
(1974).
68. In the Noriega tapes case involving CNN, a special federal prosecutor proceed-
ed by information. By agreement of both sides the case was tried by a judge, not a
jury. Larry Rohter, CNN Charged Over Tapes of Noriega, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994,
at A16.
After CNN was convicted of criminal contempt, the news organization agreed to
broadcast an apology for defying the judge's order, in return for not having to pay a
nature and can be avoided by obeying a court order.' Punishment for
civil contempt can be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon
notice and opportunity to be heard. Neither a jury trial nor proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt is required."m
The nature of the penalty determines whether it is civil or criminal
contempt. If the punishment is coercive in nature, and imposes either
an indefinite jail sentence or per diem fines, it is clearly civil. Civil
contempts are prosecuted by a complainant rather than the state or a
special prosecutor appointed by the court, and generally any fines are
paid to the complainant."' But if the sentence is not intended to force
compliance with a judge's order, and instead seeks to vindicate the
authority of the court by punishing the contemnor, it is criminal, and
the fines are paid to the state.' 2 Once a criminal contempt proceeding
is under way, it is controlled by the court and the state. If the parties
decide to settle the original dispute that led to the civil contempt
charge, it is up to the court, not the parties, to determine whether crim-
inal contempt proceedings go forward.73
The line between civil and criminal contempt blurs when courts have
both remedial and punitive goals in mind when applying a single pun-
ishment. When imposing criminal contempt fines and punishment, the
court is not only vindicating its legal authority to enter the initial order,
it is also attempting to put into effect the law's purpose of modifying
the contennor's behavior to comply with the original order.4 The con-
tempt citation may punish a prior offense and seek to pressure the
contemnor to refrain from future disobedience. 7' In determining wheth-
er the contempt is civil or criminal, the Supreme Court will look not at
substantial fine. CNN agreed to run the apology, written by the judge, and to pay the
federal government $85,000 for Its legal fees. CNN is Sentenced for Tapes and Makes
Public Apology, N.Y. TIMs, Dec. 20, 1994, at A8.
69. International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2556
(1994).
70. Id. In the federal system, the burden of proof in civil contempt cases is by
"clear and convincing" evidence. Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 362 (1928); In re
Irving, 600 F.2d 1027, 1037 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
71. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
72. Id. One difficulty in federal cases is that once the court releases the criminal
contempt fine to the federal treasury, it takes an act of Congress for the money to
be returned to the contemnor if the conviction is overturned.
73. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union,
Local 1600, 262 N.E.2d 125 (1970) (holding that a court does not need to depend on
either a party to the litigation or the county prosecutor to pursue contempt, and that
a court can appoint special counsel), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 998 (1971).
74. Hicks v. Felock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988).
75. International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct, 2552, 2557
(1994).
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the "subjective intent of a State's laws and its courts," but at an "exami-
nation of the character of the relief itself.""
B. Direct and Indirect Contempt
It is not enough to establish whether a contempt penalty is civil or
criminal. Criminal contempt can be either direct or indirect, and the
procedural rights enjoyed by the defendant can vary depending on the
physical location of the contemptuous behavior." Direct criminal con-
tempt is often inappropriate conduct that occurs within the courtroom
or the judge's presence.m Indirect criminal contempt, which raises the
most serious First Amendment problems, involves disobedience of a
judge's order while away from the court, as when a reporter publishes a
76. Id. There are several subcategories of civil contempt. It can be described as
compensatory (retrospective) or coercive (prospective). If the judgment is compensa-
tory, the court acknowledges that it cannot secure the conduct sought by the
plaintiff, and is awarding money damages as compensation. Considering that the equi-
table powers of the court were exercised in the first place because money damages
were not adequate, this form of contempt has certain ironies. Coercive contempt is
prospective because it seeks to compel future conduct from the defendant. Compen-
satory contempt, on the other hand, is ancillary to the injunction suit, and, therefore,
there is no jury trial in most jurisdictions. About ten states reject compensatory con-
tempt partly for that reason. See Doug Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt:
Plaintiffs Remedy When a Defendant Violates an Injunction, 1980 U. ILL. L REV.
971, 982-83 n.49. Historically, there has also been a distinction between mandatory
("refusing to do an act commanded"), and prohibitory ("doing an act forbidden") in-
junctions. Bagwel, 114 S. Ct. at 2561. The Court noted in Bagwell that the distinction
is easily applied where the contempt sanctions are used to enforce orders compelling
or forbidding a "single, discrete act" Id. But the distinction between "coercion of
affirmative acts and punishment of prohibited conduct" is difficult to apply when
"conduct that can recur" is involved, or when "an injunction contains both mandatory
and prohibitory provisions." Id.
77. The states and Congress have long been concerned that allowing judges to
punish contempt by publication, which takes place outside the presence of the judge,
is susceptible to abuse. In response, Congress enacted the Federal Contempt Act of
1831 to prevent courts from summarily punishing misbehavior that takes place outside
the presence of the court, unless it is "so near thereto as to obstruct the administra-
tion of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1986). The Act, though, did not stop trial court
judges or the Supreme Court from interpreting § 401 as granting themselves broad
powers.
78. For many years, judges disregarded the language of § 401 by holding that it
was not a geographical limitation on their power to summarily punish criminal con-
tempt. The Supreme Court, in an opinion which was discredited and directly over-
ruled, briefly upheld that view. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 401
(1918), overruled by Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
story in violation of a "gag" order."
Judges have almost unrestricted power to summarily punish petty
direct criminal contempts.' It is assumed that because the judge wit-
nessed the contemptuous behavior, there is limited need for extensive
fact-finding. Moreover, appellate courts want judges to have maximum
control of court proceedings. Thus, petty direct contempts in the pres-
ence of the court traditionally have been subject to summary adjudica-
tion to "maintain order in the courtroom and the integrity of the trial
process in the face of an 'actual obstruction of justice.'"'"
Indirect criminal contempts, on the other hand, do not usually inter-
fere with court proceedings, and thus the judge's power to summarily
punish such contempts is significantly reduced.' Generally, summary
adjudication of indirect contempts is prohibited, although for a period
of time, the Supreme Court had to remind trial judges that they may
not impose such punishment in First Amendment cases absent compel-
ling reasons.' Judges generally provide notice and the opportunity to
79. See, e.g., In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986); United
States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
80. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 195 (1968). Petty in this context means less
than six months in jail, but there may well be a substantial fine.
81. By finding someone in direct criminal contempt, a judge is combining the roles
of grand jury, prosecutor, jury and judge. For a general discussion of the power of
courts to punish contempt summarily, see Wilson v. United States, 421 U.S. 309,
315-16 (1975); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 513 (1974); Harris v. United
States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965). The Supreme Court held in BagweU that if the con-
temptuous behavior does not constitute a direct contempt, and the court waits until
the completion of the trial before imposing punishment, there are weaker grounds for
allowing summary punishment. International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell,
114 S. Ct. 2552, 2560 (1994). The Court also held that the fact that the union was
warned in advance that continued strike activity would be punished by contempt
does not make it civil contempt. Id. at 2562. "Due process traditionally requires that
criminal laws provide prior notice both of the conduct to be prohibited and of the
sanction to be imposed." Id.
82. There are situations when behavior outside the courtroom clearly could inter-
fere with the administration of justice. If, for example, a news organization dissemi-
nates information about a key piece of evidence not admitted at trial with a
non-sequestered jury, a mistrial may result. However, the urgent need to take immedi-
ate action In direct contempt is not usually present in cases involving indirect disobe-
dience.
83. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925) (reversing a 30-day jail sen-
tence of an attorney who sent a letter to a judge in chambers criticizing a decision
and requesting that the judge disqualify himself). The Supreme Court has provided
substantial protection to media defendants In cases involving indirect criminal con-
tempt. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (finding that newspaper editor's con-
tempt conviction for unfairly reporting events of pending state trial violates constitu-
tional right of freedom of expression because judiciary has no special power to sup-
press or censor reports of pending litigation); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946) (stating that criticism of a judge's inclinations or actions neither presents clear
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explain why the defendant should be not be held in contempt.u How-
ever, often the facts are known to the court, and there is nothing the
contemnor can say at the "show cause" hearing to prevent punishment
from being imposed.
An injunction or order must comply with 65(d) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.' The order must lay out specific obligations and
may not do so by reference to other documents.' The rule does not
require "unwieldy" specificity, but only that the injunction "be framed
so that those enjoined will know what conduct the court has prohib-
ited."8
and present danger to justice nor warrants punishment for contempt); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (finding that judicial punishment for contempt must be
scrutinized, particularly when it affects freedom of expression); Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33 (1941) (discussing court's power to use criminal contempt as punishment
for out-of-court publication about pending case).
84. A judge cannot prosecute an indirect criminal contempt, but must rely on ei-
ther one of the party's counsel, appointed counsel, or the state or local prosecutor to
do so. If, however, a judge goes to great lengths to secure a special prosecutor to
pursue the contempt charge, the appearance of unfairness or bias may arise when
that judge eventually presides over the contempt proceeding.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d). The rule states:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth
the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in rea-
sonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the
act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to
the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon
those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual
notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
28 U.S.C. § 65(d) (1988). See United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 267 (5th Cr. 1971)
(holding that Rule 65(d) was a "codification rather than a limitation of courts'
common-law powers," and therefore "cannot be read to restrict the inherent power of
a court to protect its ability to render a binding judgment"). In Ha//, the court upheld
contempt convictions in a desegregation case against a person who was not an original
party to the case, and was not acting in concert with the parties. Id, at 263-64.
86. H.K. Porter Co. v. Nat'l Friction Prods., 568 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1977). The court
held that an order adopting a "settlement agreement," but specifying no obligations of
the agreement, was inadequate support for a contempt order because the settlement
order "did not use language which turned a contractual duty into an obligation to
obey an operative command." Id. at 27.
87. Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding
an injunction prohibiting employer from "engaging in . . .unlawful employment prac-
tice" sufficiently specific because it "recited that defendant violated Title VII by con-
structively discharging plaintiff when she was pregnant"). See also Professional Assoc.
of College Educators v. El Paso County Community College District, 730 F.2d 258,
273 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that injunction prohibiting retaliation of discrimination by
C. Abuse of Contempt
The contempt power of judges is as awesome as it is indispensable.'
Judges, themselves, recognize that it should be used "sparingly," and
probably few courts would issue orders they know to be invalid, then
hold someone in contempt for violating that order.' Where such or-
ders interfere with the exercise of First Amendment rights, however,
those subject to them may not have the time or resources to pursue an
appeal or modification of the order before a deadline to publish or
broadcast. Under those circumstances, they must disseminate the infor-
mation, then challenge the original order while appealing the contempt
conviction.
That the contempt power can be abused is illustrated in several cases
that show some judges not only lack judicial "temperament," but cannot
always be trusted to exercise responsibly the arsenal of powers avail-
able in a court's equity jurisdiction, especially when First Amendment
interests are at stake.
In Goldblum v. National Broadcasting Corp.,' a California district
court action sought to enjoin NBC from broadcasting "Billion Dollar
Bubble," a report about securities and insurance fraud. The former CEO
of a company criticized in the program sought an injunction to stop
NBC from airing it, and the court agreed to view the program prior to
its broadcast."1 The judge ordered counsel for NBC to produce the doc-
umentary so he could view it for "inaccuracies," the implication being
that if such inaccuracies were found, the judge would enjoin its
broadcast. When counsel declined to produce the documentary, he was
immediately incarcerated."
the District against employees was sufficiently specific); Hall v. Wood, 443 So.2d 834,
841-42 (Miss. 1983) (holding that as long as the court clearly explains the ends to be
accomplished, it need not be as detailed in laying out the means by which to attain
those goals).
88. Judges obviously need the power of contempt to force compliance with and
punish defiance of their orders. But judges enjoy absolute immunity from liability for
judicial acts, and punishment for issuing unconstitutional orders and holding in con-
tempt those who violate such orders, might be nothing more than a mild rebuke in
an appellate opinion. See generaUy Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (finding
judge who approved a petition for sterilization of a minor immune from liability even
if his approval was in error).
89. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
90. 584 F.2d 904 (th Cir. 1978).
91. The CEO was serving a federal prison sentence for his part in the fraud when
he filed the action. He claimed the program would present a false and inaccurate
portrayal of his and his company's role in the fraud, and that it would jeopardize his
release on parole and future litigation against him. Id. at 905-06.
92. Id. at 906.
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Any judge who had read Nebraska Press Association,' or who had
an elementary understanding of the major prior restraint cases,' would
know that such an order was unconstitutional.' Because the Ninth Cir-
cuit declared the order "void," it had no trouble holding that the order
need not have been obeyed.' Presumably, if such an order were en-
tered in a jurisdiction that applies the collateral bar rule, a court would
uphold punishment of NBC's counsel for criminal contempt.'
NBC's counsel in Goldblum was not alone in finding that judges may
abuse the powers of their office. Zarcone v. Perry,' which involved a
remarkable display of judicial arrogance, would be amusing if it did not
demonstrate how awesome the powers of a judge can be. Judge William
Perry of the District Court of Suffolk County, Long Island, saw a food
vending truck outside the courthouse as he sat in chambers during a
break from the evening session of traffic court. He asked a deputy sher-
iff to get him some coffee. Both Perry and the deputy thought the cof-
fee tasted "putrid," and the judge ordered the deputy to bring the coffee
vendor "in front of me in cuffs."9
93. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
94. See supra note 30.
95. The Ninth Circuit wrote in Goldblum:
We find no authority which is even a remote justification for issuance of a
prior restraint on a theory that parole officials would somehow become in-
flamed by the contents of a communication or on a theory that a wholly
speculative criminal prosecution might commence at some future date ....
The order to produce the film in aid of a frivolous application for a prior re-
straint suffers the constitutional deficiencies of the application for an injunc-
tion. The order not only created a reasonable apprehension of an impending
prior restraint, it was also a threatened interference with the editorial pro-
cess. The district court's order was therefore void.
584 F.2d at 906-07.
96. The court further stated:
A broadcaster or publisher should not, in circumstances such as those in this
case, be required to make a sudden appearance in court and then to take
urgent measures to secure appellate relief, all the while weighing the delicate
question of whether or not refusal to comply with an apparently invalid order
constitutes a contempt.
Id. at 907.
97. In Goldblum, the incarceration was apparently civil in nature, and was thus
intended to force the attorney to comply with the judge's order. If the collateral bar
rule were strictly applied, the invalidity of the original order would have been irrele-
vant, and Goldblum's conviction would have been upheld.
98. 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978).
99. Id. at 53.
. Two plainclothes officers accompanied the uniformed deputy as they
handcuffed Zarcone, the hapless coffee vendor, and then paraded him
through the courthouse hallway in full view of dozens of people."°
Zarcone was taken, still handcuffed, to the judge's chambers where a
"pseudo-official" inquisition began.'"' With a court reporter present,
the judge told Zarcone that he was keeping the coffee for evidence, and
then screamed at Zarcone for twenty minutes, "threatening him and his
'livelihood'. " "° Before Zarcone was allowed to leave, the judge ordered
the deputy to note his vehicle and vending license numbers and told
Zarcone, "Mister, you are going to be sorrier before I get through with
you."
103
Zarcone then resumed his mobile truck route and returned to his
spot outside the courthouse about forty-five minutes later."° Perry
again ordered the deputy to bring Zarcone to him." He told Zarcone
he was going to have the coffee analyzed, and only if Zarcone would
admit that he did something wrong would Perry drop the matter."°
Zarcone consistently denied that anything was wrong with the coffee,
and no charges were filed against him. The court of appeals said the
abuse of power in this case was "intolerable." 7
If one concludes from Zarcone that serving coffee to a judge may be
risky, honking your car horn at a judge on a highway may create even
more problems. In Malina v. Gonzales," the plaintiff honked his horn
100. Id. Zarcone later recalled that one bystander observed they were locking up
the "frankfurter man." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. Because Zarcone was successful in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the
judge-one of the few cases where judicial immunity was defeated-the court of ap-
peals assumed that the jury believed Zarcone's version of the events. Id. The jury
awarded plaintiff $80,000 in compensatory damages against Perry and the sheriff's
deputy, $60,000 in punitive damages against Perry, and $1000 in punitive damages
against the sheriff. Id, Only Perry appealed. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 54.
105. Id. The deputy said that. Zarcone did not have to be handcuffed. Id. As a re-
sult of his encounter with Judge Perry, Zarcone testified "that he was very upset by
the incident, that he could not sleep, and that he started to stutter and get head-
aches." Id. Judge Perry was removed from office because of his treatment of
Zarcone, and for testifying falsely at his disciplinary hearing. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 57. In upholding the judgments, the court of appeals held that §1983
permitted punitive damages in these circumstances, and concluded that the damages
were not excessive considering the judge's "outrageous" conduct. Id. at 56-57. Be-
cause judges normally enjoy absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to their
judicial duties, the court of appeals must have concluded that Judge Perry's actions
were outside his judicial duties. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
108. 994 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1993).
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and motioned for a driver, a state court judge, to move out of the fast
lane where he was apparently going too slowly.' Judge Gonzales put
a flashing red light on his car, and pulled Malina's car over."'
Three hours later a police officer arrived at Malina's house and told
him to report to Judge Gonzales' chambers the next day.' After in-
forming Malina of his violations, in the courtroom, Judge Gonzales sen-
tenced him to five hours in jail.' Malina was handcuffed and taken
through the courthouse lobby, across the street, and into the Baton
Rouge jail. There he was fingerprinted, photographed and impris-
oned.1 3 The court of appeals held that Judge Gonzales enjoyed "abso-
lute immunity" from suit for actions related to the contempt citation;
however, the court found that pulling Malina over was not within his
judicial duties. Therefore, no immunity applied to that action."4
Another person found himself thrown into jail after a Florida judge
overheard a conversation between the plaintiff and the judge's secre-
tary."5 Jack Harper wanted to leave his child support check with the
judge's secretary because his ex-wife, who worked for a different judge
in the same courthouse, was away from the office. Judge Merckle, who
overhead the conversation from his chambers, told his secretary to get
Harper's divorce file."6 As he waited, the judge saw that only a post
office box was listed on Harper's child support check."7 He demanded
109. Id. at 1123.
110. Id. Malina, fearing that the unmarked car with a red light that could be pur-
chased by anyone posed a threat, did not pull over right away. He apparently had to
be nearly forced to the side of the road. Id. at 1123. Gonzales told Malina that as a
judge, he had the powers of a police officer and had authority to arrest him, al-
though he did not do so. Id.
111. Id.
112. The courtroom was empty except for court personnel and closed to the public.
No record was made of the proceedings. The violations included "fleeing to allude,"
"resisting an officer," "public endangerment," "disobeying an officer," "reckless driv-
ing," and "leaving the scene." Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1124. The court of appeals noted that although Judge Gonzales' act of
pulling Malina over and ordering him to appear before the court were "illegitimate,"
nevertheless, the judge had subject matter jurisdiction in the case. Id. at 1125. How-
ever, the court also concluded that Gonzales did not have the authority to stop
Malina, and that he is no different from anyone who purchases a red light and stops
people on the interstate. Id. at 1126.
115. Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981).
116. Id. The judge claimed that he had heard around the courthouse that there was
an outstanding contempt violation against the plaintiff. Id. at 851.
117. Id.
that Harper provide his complete address, and he complied."8 At that
point the judge instructed Harper to "raise his right hand to be sworn
in," presumably so that his responses to the judge's questions would be
under oath."9
After Harper left the secretary's office, the judge ordered court bai-
liffs to go find him."n Harper tried to elude the pursuing bailiffs by
seeking refuge in a friend's office. 2' The bailiffs trapped and appre-
hended Harper and returned him to the judge's chambers."2 Judge
Merckle then began a "contempt proceeding." " At the conclusion of
the proceeding he found the plaintiff in contempt and ordered him to
jail.'24 On Monday morning jail officials chained Harper to about a doz-
en prisoners, loaded him into a van, and then paraded him in shackles
past his former wife, through the halls, and into Judge Merckle's court-
room.2 ' He was released, and ordered to return a week later to the
judge's courtroom, whereupon he was sentenced to three days in
jail.2' His contempt conviction was overturned by the Florida Court of
Appeal because the controversy did not involve a case pending before
the judge, and because the visit to the judge's office was unrelated to
the judge's official capacity.'27 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the
judge's acts were not "judicial acts," and thus rejected his argument for
absolute immunity."2
Some judges use contempt to enforce dress codes. In In re De Car-
to,"' the judge decided that a female attorney who wore a sweater and
slacks was not wearing attire that was "proper and respectful," and con-
victed her of contempt."3 In Friedman v. District Court, 'f the of-
118. Id.
119. Id. Harper did not swear under oath; he testified that he promptly walked out
of the chamber. The judge claimed that Harper used profane language and bolted




123. Id. at 852.
124. Harper spent the weekend at the county jail in a six-by-eight foot, roach infest-
ed, dark, stifling cell in which the smell of vomit and human waste permeated. Id, at
853-54.
125. Id. at 854.
126. He was given credit for the three days he already spent in jail and was re-
leased. Id.
127. Id. at 859.
128. Id. at 858-59.
129. 357 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1976).
130. She was fined $50. Id. at 274. The appellate court concluded that her conduct
was not contemptuous. Id. at 275.
131. 611 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1980) (holding that an attorney can be held in contempt
for failing to comply with a reasonable dress code if there was proof of'a court
[Vol. 22: 405, 19951 "Collateral Bar" Rule
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
fending clothing was the lack of a coat and traditional tie. In Purpura
v. Purpura, the judge convicted the attorney of contempt because
the attorney unbuttoned his shirt collar and loosened his tie."
Although perhaps extreme, these examples nevertheless demonstrate
that judges make mistakes, lose their temper, and issue bad decisions.
Unfortunately, the collateral bar rule requires attorneys or third parties
to'obey the judge's order even if the order clearly violates First Amend-
ment rights. It must be obeyed unless the court lacks subject matter or
personal jurisdiction, or unless the order fits the narrow description of
"transparently invalid" in some other respect. The judge may hold in
contempt those who defy such rulings, even after an appellate court
determines the underlying order to be unconstitutional. In addition,
those who defy such rulings cannot seek damages against the judge for
harm caused by the contempt judgment and penalties.
Congress recognized long ago that judges can abuse their authority.
In 1830, Congress tried U.S. District Court Judge James Peck on Arti-
cles of Impeachment after Judge Peck imprisoned someone who pub-
lished criticism of one of his opinions."3 As a result of the entire inci-
dent, Congress curtailed a judge's power to summarily punish contempt
by publication." Under 18 U.S.C. § 401(1), the contemptuous behavior
order establishing the dress code and proof that the attorney was familiar with the
code).
132. 847 P.2d 314 (N.M. Ct App. 1993).
133. Id. at 315. The court of appeals upheld the conviction. Id. at 317. The same
lawyer was also fined $50 for direct criminal contempt for wearing a "bandanna" in-
stead of a conventional tie, and for not wearing a jacket in court. State v.
Cherryhomes, 840 P.2d 1261, 1262 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
134. The Senate eventually acquitted Judge Peck. For a history of the Judge Peck
incident, see Walter Nelles & Carol W. King, Contempt by Publication in the United
States, 28 COLUM. L REV. 401 (1928); see also Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33,
45-46, (1941) (discussing the Judge Peck incident).
135. The statute, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 401, authorizes summary punishment for
direct contempt-
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprison-
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none others,
as-(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice; (2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in
their official transactions; (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ,
process, order, rule, decree, or command.
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). There is some overlap between 18 U.S.C. § 401 and § 1503.
Although § 401 is confined to courtroom misconduct, some conduct covered by § 1503,
which requires indictment and trial, may occur in the presence of the court. See 18
must take place either in the courtroom or close by.'" In effect, the
statute applies a geographical limitation on the contempt power of
federal courts. 7 Nevertheless, § 401 allows courts to impose signifi-
cant punishments."'8
Ill. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE COLLATERAL BAR RULE IN
FEDERAL COURTS
A. Walker v. Birmingham
The Supreme Court provided the first clear statement that court or-
ders must be obeyed, even when they appear to be unconstitutional, in
Howat v. Kansas."a The principle that a contempt conviction will sur-
U.S.C. § 1503 (1982) (providing for a fine or imprisonment of anyone who corruptly
influences or inures a court officer or juror); see also In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50
(1943) (holding that a contempt sentence "could only be a fine or imprisonment," but
not both); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding a § 401 and
a § 1503 violation when defendants attempted to sell secret grand jury testimony tran-
scripts), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978)..
136. See Higgins v. United States, 160 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (offense that "oc-
curred in the corridor of the court, about thirty feet from the entrance to the
courtroom" was within "presence" of the court), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 840 (1947).
137. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315 n.6 (1975) ("[T]he phrase 'in its
presence or so near thereto' was intended to apply a geographical limitation on the
power.") (quoting Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 50 (1941)).
138. See United States v. Gabay, 923 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1991) (upholding five-year
sentence for fleeing shortly before trial); United States v. Di Paolo, 804 F.2d 225 (2d
Cir. 1987) (upholding a 10 year sentence for contacting member of witness's family in
violation of court order); United States v. Papadakis, 802 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1986) (up-
holding a five-year sentence for refusing to testify before a grand jury despite a grant
of immunity), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092 (1987); United States v. Ray, 683 F.2d 1116
(7th Cir. 1982) (upholding three-year sentence for failing to provide handwriting sam-
ples pursuant to a motion to compel); United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381 (7th Cir.
1976) (upholding four-year sentence for refusing to answer question at criminal trial
despite grant of immunity).
139. 258 U.S. 181 (1922) (holding that workers cannot disobey antistrike injunction
issued by state court on the grounds that It was invalid under the Federal Constitu-
tion). The Court wrote:
An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with equity
powers upon pleadings properly invoking its action, and served upon persons
made parties therein and within the jurisdiction, must be obeyed by them
however erroneous the action of the court may be, even if the error be in
the assumption of the validity of a seeming but void law going to the merits
of the case. It is for the court of first instance to determine the question of
the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly
review, either by itself or by a higher court, Its orders based on its decisions
are to be respected, and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful au-
thority, to be punished.
Id. 189-90.
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vive the invalidation of the underlying order was reinforced in Walker v.
Birmingham,4 ° although the Court did not specifically conclude that
the injunction prohibiting the civil rights activists from parading with-
out a permit was unconstitutional. 4 '
In Walker, the trial court issued an ex parte order forbidding civil
rights activists from parading on the streets without a permit.'" At the
contempt hearing the judge rejected the petitioners' claim that the in-
junction was "vague and overbroad, and restrained free speech."'" In
issuing the order, the judge incorporated the language of the permit
ordinance,'" which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham.'"
The Court clearly illustrated the difference between an "unconstitu-
tional" injunction and an unconstitutional statute. Based on the same
actions-demonstrating on Good Friday and Easter Sunday-the trial
court convicted the petitioners in Walker of contempt for violating the
ex parte order and for violating the permit law. The Supreme Court
overturned the convictions for violating the ordinance but the contempt
convictions were upheld."
The Shuttlesworth Court had little problem striking down the ordi-
nance, noting that its past decisions "have made clear that a person
faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and
engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for
which the law purports to require a license."47 Nevertheless, the Walk-
er Court would not allow defiance of a judicial order even if based on
the unconstitutional statute unless the order was "transparently invalid
or had only a frivolous pretense to validity."'" The Court expressed
140. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
141. The Court in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), wrote: -The
breadth and vagueness of the injunction itself would also unquestionably be subject
to constitutional question. But the way to raise that question was to apply to the
Alabama courts to have the injunction modified or dissolved." Id at 317.
142. When the activists sought a permit from the Commissioner of Public Safety,
Eugene "Bull" Connor, he said, "No, you will not get a permit in Birmingham, Ala-
bama to picket I will picket you over to the City Jail." Id. at 317 n.9.
143. Id. at 311.
144. Id. at 321-22.
145. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
146. Four years after the demonstrations, Dr. King and his colleagues returned to
Alabama to serve their five days in jail. They were also fined $50.00 each.
147. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969).
148. Walker, 388 U.S. at 315.
sympathy for the petitioners' "impatient commitment to their cause,"
but held that "respect for judicial process is a small price to pay for the
civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning to consti-
tutional freedom."' 9
Justice Brennan sharply criticized this conclusion in his dissent in
Walker."w He stated that the petitioners had no realistic expectation
that an appellate court would overturn the ex parte order in an emer-
gency appeal before the march, scheduled for two days later."'
Brennan sharply criticized the view that if an ex parte order merely re-
cites the words of an invalid statute, such an order must be obeyed."n
The Supreme Court has not decided a collateral bar rule case involv-
ing the First Amendment on the merits since Walker."n In the absence
of national collateral bar rule standards, lower courts have applied or
rejected the rule, depending on whether the First Amendment cases in
which they developed collateral bar rule standards involved pure
speech or speech plus conduct. Additionally, lower courts have consid-
ered how much reverence those decisions give to First Amendment
principles.
B. United States v. Dickinson
Nowhere has the collateral bar rule been embraced with more enthu-
siasm than in United States v. Dickinson. ' Although recognizing that
the case presented a "civil libertarians' nightmare," with a "classic con-
frontation between 'two of the most cherished policies of our
civilization'-freedom of the press... [and] the right of the accused to
149. Id. at 321.
150. Id. at 338. Justice Brennan wrote:
(T]he Court empties the Supremacy Clause of its primacy by elevating a state
rule of judicial administration above the right of free expression guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution. And the Court does so by letting loose a devas-
tatingly destructive weapon for suppression of cherished freedoms heretofore
believed indispensable to maintenance of our free society. I cannot believe
that this distortion of the hierarchy of values upon which our society has
been and must be ordered can have any significance beyond its function as a
vehicle to affirm these contempt convictions.
Id at 338. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Fortas joined the dissent.
The Chief Justice and Justice Douglas also wrote separate dissenting opinions.
151. Id. at 348-49. See also, Oppenheimer, supra, note 13.
152. Walker, 388 U.S. at 34647.
153. Providence Journal Co. provided that opportunity. See supra note 2 and ac-
companying text
154. 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972), offd, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 979 (1973).
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a fair and impartial trial," the court held that even unconstitutional
orders must be obeyed."
In Dickinson, two newspaper reporters were convicted of contempt
and each fined $300 by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana for violating an order not to report the details of a
pretrial hearing.5 7 The court held a Younger v. Harris" hearing, fo-
cusing on whether the state had legitimate grounds for pursuing a mur-
der conspiracy prosecution against Frank Stewart, a VISTA volunteer
active in the civil rights movement." The state accused him of plot-
ting the murder of the mayor of Baton Rouge.'M Stewart alleged that
the state prosecution was groundless and was intended solely to harass
him and suppress his First Amendment rights.''
On remand, at the second evidentiary hearing, the trial judge issued
an order prohibiting news organizations from reporting the details of
the hearing because of concern that publishing the testimony could
interfere with the state court in selecting an impartial jury."M The
judge allowed the press to report that a hearing had been held, but he
would not permit the "reporting of the details of the evidence" taken
155. Id. at 499 (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941)).
156. Id. at 509-10.
157. Id. at 500.
158. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (a hearing to determine if a prosecution was brought in bad
faith).
159. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 500. The district court originally declined to restrain the
state court from further prosecuting Stewart. Stewart v. Dameron, 321 F. Supp. 886
(E.D. La. 1971). However, the court of appeals "vacated that order and remanded the
case for a new evidentlary hearing, since 'Stewart had not been allowed to put on
any evidence concerning his allegations of bad faith prosecution and harassment' at
the original proceeding." Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 500 (quoting Stewart v. Dameron, 448
F.2d 396, 397 (5th Cir. 1971).
160. Id. at 499.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 500. The court stated that:
It is ordered that no, no [sic] report of the testimony taken in this case
today shall be made in any newspaper or by radio or television, or by any
other news media. This case will, in all probability, be the subject of further
prosecution; at least there is the possibility that it may. In order to avoid
undue publicity which could in any way interfere with the rights of the liti-
gants in connection with any further proceedings that might be had in this or
other courts, there shall be no reporting of the details of any evidence taken
during the course of this hearing today.
Id.
during the hearing. Two reporters, who admitted that their actions
violated the court order, wrote articles for their newspapers summariz-
ing the testimony.' A show cause order was issued and following a
hearing, the court found the reporters guilty of criminal contempt for
knowingly violating the order, and fined them $300 each.
After reviewing the historical clash between First Amendment and
Sixth Amendment rights, the court of appeals concluded that the
judge's order was an unconstitutional prior restraint." The court then
turned to the validity of the contempt citation and the question of
whether "a person may with impunity knowingly violate an order which
turns out to be invalid.""7
The court began its analysis of the contempt issue with the "well-
established principle" in proceedings for criminal contempt that "an in-
junction duly issuing out of a court having subject matter and personal
jurisdiction must be obeyed, irrespective of the ultimate validity of the





166. Id. at 509. The court cited six reasons for its decision. First, the court held
that for First Amendment freedoms to be abridged, the "substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high." Id. at 507 (quoting
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941)); accord Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
376 (1947) (requiring that the expression "immediately imperil" the administration of
justice before the First Amendment right is abridged); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 347 (1946) (stating that "freedom of public comment should weigh heavily
against a possible tendency to influence" trials when protecting First Amendment
rights).
Second, because the publicity surrounding the present trial was neither unfair
nor excessive, the judge could not sanction the press to prevent disruption.
Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 508. But see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966)
(holding that a trial court can impose sanctions on the press to "protect their pro-
cesses from prejudicial outside influences").
Third, "the public's right to know the facts was particularly compelling here,
since the issue being litigated was the accusation that elected state officials had
trumped up charges against an individual solely because of his race and political civil
rights activities." Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 508.
Fourth, the district court's order was "not directed at any named party or court
official,... but rather it sought to control activities of non-parties to the law-
suit-namely, two reporters-in matters not going t the merits of the substantive is-
sues of the ongoing trial." Id.
Fifth, the appellate court held that while the district court's effort to protect the
accused was "laudable," it put the federal judge in the role of "policing the climate
of the community to insure a sterile trial in the State Court." Id. Finally, the appeals
court held that there are "alternative cures for prejudicial publicity far less disruptive
of constitutional freedoms than an absolute ban on publication." Id.
167. Id. at 509.
168. Id. (citing Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967)); see generally
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ed that "[p]eople simply cannot have the luxury of knowing that they
have a right to contest the correctness of the judge's order in deciding
whether to willfully disobey it .... Court orders have to be obeyed
until they are reversed or set aside in an orderly fashion.""s The court,
in following the principles of Walker, held that "[a]bsent a showing of
'transparent invalidity' or patent frivolity surrounding the order, it must
be obeyed until reversed by orderly review or disrobed of authority by
delay or frustration in the appellate process, regardless of the ultimate
determination of constitutionality or lack thereof."70
The court acknowledged that the "inviolability" of judicial orders is
"unique among governmental commands."' When legislators or exec-
utive agencies exceed constitutional limits, their mandates need not be
obeyed. tm Those who violate laws or executive orders run the risk of
criminal sanctions if they are wrong about the ultimate validity, but "if
the directive is invalid, it may be disregarded with impunity."m The
court recognized that in some situations intentional disobedience may
be the only way to test the constitutionality of such directives. 4
The appeals court stated that the elevated status of judicial orders is
"not the product of self-protection or arrogance of judges," but is re-
quired by the nature of judicial power.' Disobedience to legislative
decisions does not interfere with the legislature's ability to continue to
pass laws.' The judiciary pursues the dispute while the legislature
continues to function unencumbered by the disregard for its direc-
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S.
181 (1922); and Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
169. Id. at 509 (quoting Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 408 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Brown, C.J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 509-10.
171. Id. at 510.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 500 (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151
(1968)); see also Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-94 (1963) (ruling that failure to
obey unconstitutional order of a police officer is not punishable); Watldns v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-200 (1957) (invalidating contempt citation for refusal to testi-
fy before congressional subcommittee which failed to define scope of investigation
and which was not justified by overwhelming need); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 104 (1940) (reversing Thornhill's loitering and picketing conviction because the
conviction was based on a state statute later held unconstitutional).
174. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 510 (citing Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
tives.'" Similarly, law enforcement is not prevented by failure to con-
vict those who disregard the unconstitutional command of a police
officer.'" On the other hand, such disobedience affects courts differ-
ently: "The deliberate refusal to obey an order of the court without test-
ing its validity through established processes requires further action by
the judiciary, and therefore directly affects the judiciary's ability to dis-
charge its duties and responsibilities.""
The court acknowledged that special problems arise when the state-
ments enjoined from publication are newsworthy, noting that
"[t]imeliness of publication is the hallmark of 'news' and the difference
between 'news' and 'history' is merely a matter of hours."" Immediate
access to orderly review is a factor that will affect the "incontestable
inviolability" of the order, but unless the appellate process was "deliber-
ately stalled," news organizations may not violate an order with impuni-
ty.18' The court noted that both the district court and the court of ap-
peals were available to afford "speedy and effective review" quickly
enough to protect the right to publish while the information was still
"news. - 8
Having found that the order enjoining publication should have been
obeyed, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless vacated the contempt conviction
and remanded to the district court to determine whether it should stand
based on the finding that the order was unconstitutional." The court
of appeals wanted to give the district court judge the opportunity to
correct a "mistake of law" because the judge erroneously believed the




180. Id. at 512.
181. Id.
182. Id. The court added:
Of course the nature of the expression sought to be exercised is a factor to
be considered in determining whether First Amendment ights can be effec-
tively protected by orderly review so as to render disobedience to otherwise
unconstitutional mandates nevertheless contemptuous. But newsmen are citi-
zens, too. They too may sometimes have to wait. They are not yet wrapped
in an immunity or given the absolute right to decide with impunity whether a
Judge's order Is to be obeyed or whether an appellate court is acting
promptly enough.
Id.
183. Id. at 514.
184. Id The court of appeals cited Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964),
where the Supreme Court remanded to the Texas courts to determine if the con-
tempt conviction should still stand once the Court invalidated a writ of prohibition
that prevented federal court plaintiffs from pursuing their claims in the Fifth Circuit
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On remand, Judge West reacted angrily to the suggestion that his
order was based on a mistake of law.Iw He maintained that the origi-
nal order, struck down by the court of appeals, was valid and issued in
good faith." He reinstated the penalties and criticized the reporters
for their "public display" of contempt." Judge West concluded that
allowing the defendants to escape contempt punishment after they
violated his order would undermine judicial authority."m In a per curi-
am opinion before a different three-judge panel, the court of appeals
upheld Judge West's reimposition of the contempt citations."s
C. United States v. CBS
The Fifth Circuit's strong endorsement of the collateral bar rule in
Dickinson suggested that any news organization appealing a contempt
conviction for disobeying an order would see the conviction sustained
even if the underlying order was later invalidated. Yet in United States
v. CBS,"9 the court not only held that the order was an unconstitu-
Court of Appeals. On remand, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals determined that the
contempt judgments Were inappropriate in view of the Supreme Court's decision that
the restraining orders were unlawful. The Tenth Circuit adopted a similar approach in
Dunn v. United States, 388 F.2d 511, 513 (10th Cir. 1968).
185. United States v. Dickinson, 349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972).
186. Id. at 228-29. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
187. Dickinson, 349 F. Supp. at 228. The court noted that the defendants, rather
than seeking judicial review,
decided instead to announce to Court personnel that they were going to vio-
late the order and then, after violating the order, contemptuously announced
to the public, at the end of their published articles, that they had published
this story despite an order of the Court ordering them not to do so. It was
primarily this public display of utter contempt for this Court's order that
prompted the contempt citation .... It was the intentional, willful, flagrant
and contemptuous disregard of the Court's order before in any way attempt-
ing to have the order, which was obviously issued in good faith, judicially
reviewed. It was upon this action, rather than a mistake of law, that the con-
tempt citation was bottomed.
Id. at 228-29.
188. The judge stated, in colorful language, that it was "inappropriate in this case
for me to try to imitate the proverbial catfish who could talk out of both sides of
his mouth and whistle all at the same time." Id. at 228.
189. 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
190. The court separated the issues arising from one factual scenario into two dif-
ferent opinions. The first opinion dealt with the constitutionality of the district court's
orders prohibiting the publication of sketches depicting the courtroom or its partici-
pants. United States v. CBS, 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974) [hereinafter CBS Order].
tional prior restraint, it also reversed the contempt conviction because
of procedural defects in the issuance of the order. 9' Although the
court of appeals expressed no view as to whether the lower court
should pursue the contempt conviction, no subsequent trial was
held."
The case involved the highly publicized trial of individuals known as
the "Gainesville Eight," who were accused of conspiring to disrupt the
1972 Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida." At a pretrial
hearing, the judge issued a verbal order that "no sketches in the court-
room would be permitted to be made for publication."'
Following these orders, a CBS News sketch artist instead watched
the proceedings for several hours, and then went into the hall to sketch
what she had seen. After discovering what the sketch artist had done,
the judge confiscated the sketches, and issued another verbal order
prohibiting sketches. No court reporter was present during this meet-
ing, but the judge later stated that it was clear that he would permit no
sketches no matter where they were made."
The artist did not return to the courthouse, but later sketched the
trial participants from memory, and four sketches were televised on the
CBS Morning News." A few weeks later, CBS was adjudged guilty of
contempt for defying the judge's order.'
The Fifth Circuit recognized that "strong measures" are sometimes
needed to protect the rights of the accused, but concluded that the
judge's order prohibiting the broadcast of sketches was an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint."m The appellate court held that before a prior re-
straint may be imposed by a judge, there must be "an imminent, not
merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must
not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil."" The
appellate court could not find a case where a state or federal court had
The companion case, decided the same day, reversed the contempt convictions which
were based on these unconstitutional orders. United States v. CBS, 497 F.2d 107 (5th
Cir. 1974) [hereinafter CBS Contempt].
191. CBS Contempt, 479 F.2d at 110.
192. Id.
193. CBS Order, 497 F.2d at 103.
194. Id.
195. Id. The judge's orders were not reduced to writing until he issued the
show-cause order some time later. Id. at n.l.
196. Id. at 103.
197. CBS was fined $500.00. CBS Contempt, 479 F.2d at 109.
198. CBS Order, 497 F.2d at 104-05.
199. Id. at 104 (quoting United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 496 (5th Cir. 1972);
see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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prohibited the publication of sketches, and stated that even if such an
order were permitted, it would have to be very narrowly tailored.'
The court further held that the ban on sketching in the courtroom was
also invalid where there had been no showing that "sketching was in
any way obtrusive or disruptive.""
The court then turned to the issue of contempt and overturned the
conviction in a separate opinion.' The appellate court was especially
concerned that because the orders were verbal in nature, it was neces-
sary to prove their content by the testimony of those individuals who
had witnessed the conversation between the judge and the CBS em-
ployees.' The court of appeals expressed grave misgivings about the
appearance of unfairness when a judge tries a case in which he was a
principal actor in the factual issues to be determined. Because CBS was
entitled to a "totally fair and impartial" tribunal, and because of the
"strange milieu of a judge passing on the clarity of his own orders," the
court reversed the contempt conviction and remanded the case for trial
before a different judge. 4
The court's action in CBS was not a rejection of the collateral bar
rule which had been strongly endorsed by the same court in Dickinson.
The appellate opinion left open for consideration by the lower court the
"advisability of pursuing the contempt action" as it had in
Dickinson.' It would not, however, uphold a contempt conviction
where there was any "hint or appearance of bias." '
200. CBS Order, 497 U.S. at 106. The court concluded that "the total ban on the
publication of sketches is too remotely related to the danger sought to be avoided,
and is, moreover, too broadly drawn to withstand constitutional scrutiny." Id.
201. Id. at 106-07.
202. CBS Contempt, 479 F.2d at 108.
203. The witnesses at the contempt proceeding were the judge's secretary, his law
clerk, and a local newspaper reporter. In all significant respects, the witnesses' testi-
mony was consistent Id. The second meeting, at which the judge told the artist that
no sketches could be made and used on the air, even if made from memory, was
recounted by the newspaper reporter. The judge stated that "absolutely no sketches
were to be broadcast, regardless of where they were made." Id.
204. Id. at 109.
205. It will be recalled that in Dickinson, the trial judge reimposed the contempt
conviction. See supra note 4.
206. CBS Contempt, 479 F.2d at 109. See also Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S.
455 (1971).
D. United States v. Providence Journal
The Fifth Circuit's eloquent defense of the collateral bar rule in
Dickinson not only failed to persuade a number of state courts,"m it
was directly contradicted and criticized by the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in In re Providence Journal Co.' The newspaper and its ex-
ecutive editor were found guilty of criminal contempt by a federal dis-
trict court after the newspaper published an article about the late Ray-
mond L.S. Patriarca, a reputed organized crime figure.' His son had
filed a complaint asserting that the FBI wrongfully released the logs and
memoranda to the news media, and seeking a motion for temporary
injunctive relief, which the court granted."'
The district court issued the order on November 13, 1985, and sched-
uled a hearing for two days later at which time it would decide whether
or not to vacate the order. 1 ' On November 14th, one day after the
court issued the order and one day before the hearing, the newspaper
published the article about the senior Patriarca.2 1 Initially, the son
filed a motion for contempt, but when he declined to pursue it, the
district court appointed a special prosecutor."3 Following a hearing,
the district court found the editor and newspaper guilty of criminal con-
tempt,2"4 and later imposed a suspended 18-month jail term on the ex-
ecutive editor, ordered him to perform 200 hours of community service,
and fined the newspaper $100,000.5
207. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
208. 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986).
209. The FBI had conducted electronic surveillance of Patriarca in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. The FBI later destroyed the tapes, but retained the logs
and memoranda compiled from the recordings. When the Journal requested the mate-
rials under the Federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, the FBI denied
the request on the grounds that disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion of
privacy. After Patriarca died, the newspaper renewed the request and the FBI provid-
ed the materials not only to the Journal, but also to other news organizations. Id. at
1344.
210. Id. at 1345.
211. Id. Upon reflection, the judge determined that the order violated the First
Amendment and vacated it at the November 15th hearing.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Patriarca v. F.B.I., 630 F. Supp. 993 (D.R.I. 1986).
215. Providence, 820 F.2d at 1345. Federal District Court Judge Boyle was quoted as
saying that the newspaper "had chosen to violate an appropriate court order and
boldly communicate that defiance to hundreds of thousands of residents in this area."
Newspaper Fined by Federal Judge, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 3, 1986, at All. The $100,000
fine was determined by multiplying the newspaper's average daily circulation of
200,000 by 50 cents. The judge derived that figure, according to the Associated Press,
by adding 15 cents per copy of estimated advertising revenues to the 35 cents per
copy price. Judge Fines Rhode Island Paper $100,000 for Contempt, THE SEATLE
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Although the district court vacated the restraining order, the court of
appeals first considered whether the order was an unconstitutional
prior restraint. It observed that the case presented a conflict between
two fundamental principles, "the hallowed First Amendment principle
that the press shall not be subject to prior restraints," and the "sine qua
non of orderly government, that, until modified or vacated, a court
order must be obeyed.""6 It concluded that it was "patently clear" that
the November 13th order failed the Nebraska Press Association test."7
The court of appeals expressed much understanding of the role of daily
newspapers, and stated that the district court did not preserve the
"status quo" because newspapers have a right to publish information
when the editors decide to publish.1 8
The court distinguished Walker by holding that the order in Provi-
dence was "transparently invalid," one of the exceptions to the collater-
al bar rule noted in Walker."' Recognizing an exception to the rule for
such orders, the Providence court held that requiring a party to obey,
upon penalty of contempt a transparently invalid order would "give the
courts powers far in excess of any authorized by the Constitution or
Congress." ' The court explained that "although a court order-even
an arguably incorrect court order--demands respect, so does the right
of the citizen to be free of clearly improper exercises of judicial author-
ity."2
21
Even while rejecting the collateral bar rule, the court of appeals not-
ed that the "line between a transparently invalid order and one that is
merely invalid is, of course, not always distinct," and that there should
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1986, at A7. The next day the judge granted an indefinite stay of the
fine and suspended sentence so that the newspaper could appeal. Judge Delays Fine
to Let Newspaper File Appeal, N.Y. TMEs, Apr. 4, 1986, at AS.
216. Providence, 820 F.2d at 1344.
217. Id. at 1349. The First Circuit held that a party seeking a prior restraint against
the press must show not only that publication "will result in damage to a near-sacred
right, but also that the restraint will be effective and that no less extreme measures
are available." Id. at 1351. The court noted that the district court had failed to make
a finding on either of these issues, "an omission that made the invalidity of the order
even more transparent" Id,
218. The court added: "A restraining order disturbs the status quo and impinges on
the exercise of editorial discretion. News is a constantly changing and dynamic quan-
tity. Today's news will often be tomorrow's history." Id.
219. Providence, 820 F.2d at 1346-47.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1347.
be a "heavy presumption" in favor of validity of an order.'
Several factors led the court to the conclusion that the order was
transparently invalid. First, the district court failed to make a finding of
the conditions required under Nebraska Press Association.' Second,
the court issued a prior restraint order without holding a "full and fair
hearing" with procedural protections.' Finally, the court held that the
other grounds asserted by Patriarca could not support injunctive relief
against a media organization in these circumstances.'
In an unusual development, the First Circuit granted a petition for
rehearing en banc and issued a per curiam opinion that modified, but
did not overrule, the three-judge panel's opinion.s As did the original
panel, the en banc court recognized that requiring publishers to pursue
the normal appeal process sometimes posed great difficulties.2  Never-
theless, the court felt compelled to urge publishers to attempt to appeal
such orders before disobeying them.' The en banc court character-
ized its modification as "technically dictum," but believed that asking
publishers to seek orderly review of orders they consider unconstitu-
tional may avoid future tensions between the courts and journalists.'
222. Id. at 1347-48.
223. Id. at 1351; see also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
224. Providence, 820 F.2d at 1351. The matter came before the district court on an
emergency basis because Patriarca's son had apparently learned that news organiza-
tions were preparing to publish articles about his father. Counsel for the newspaper
received the papers less than 24 hours before they made their arguments, to the dis-
trict court. The judge had to make an immediate decision without the "opportunity
for cool reflection.- Id.
225. Id. at 1350. Patriarca argued that his privacy interests permitted the court to
issue the order. Id. The court of appeals rejected the assertion that privacy interests
permitted a prior restraint order against a media organization. He also based his com-
plaint on Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (hereinafter
FOIA), and the Fourth Amendment. Title III, which provides an action for damages to
individuals injured as a result of illegal interception or disclosure of private communi-
cations does not provide for injunctive relief. Id. at 1349; see 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp.
1994). The Supreme Court has concluded that FOTA does not authorize an injunction
prohibiting a federal agency from disclosing information and that the Fourth
Amendment protects citizens from abuses of government, not private citizens. Provi-
dence, 820 F.2d at 1349-50. See also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)
(holding that FOTA does not authorize an injunction prohibiting a federal agency from
disclosing information); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) ("The purpose
of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent unreasonable governmental intrusions into the
privacy of one's person, house, papers, or effects.").
226. Providence, 820 F.2d at 1354.
227. Id. at 1354-5.
228. Id. at 1355.
229. The court wrote:
It is not asking much, beyond some additional expense and time, to require a
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The en banc court also noted that very little time elapsed between the
order and the deadline for publication. It urged publishers to make a
good faith effort to appeal, but realized that the procedures they an-
nounced cannot always be followed.'
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE COLLATERAL BAR RULE IN
STATE COURTSnI
Relatively few states have decided collateral bar rule cases involving
the First Amendment. Of the states that have, Washington, California
and Texas have made the strongest commitment to rejecting the rule in
cases involving free expression.' Other states have rejected the rule
in some First Amendment cases, but have accepted it in others.' Still
other states have approved the collateral bar rule in principle, while
finding some grounds for overturning the contempt conviction in partic-
ular cases.'
A. Washington
The Washington Supreme Court has a long history of protecting First
Amendment interests.' But despite a strong commitment to free ex-
publisher, even when it thinks it is the subject of a transparently unconstitu-
tional order of prior restraint, to make a good faith effort to seek emergency
relief from the appellate court. If timely access to the appellate court is not
available or if timely decision is not forthcoming, the publisher may then
proceed to publish and challenge the constitutionality of the order in the
contempt proceedings. In such event whatever added expense and time are
involved, such a price does not seem disproportionate to the respect owing
court processes; and there Is no prolongation of any prior restraint. On the
other hand, should the appellate court grant the requested relief, the conflict
between principles has been resolved and the expense and time involved
have vastly been offset by aborting any contempt proceedings.
Id.
230. Id.
231. Several states have decided collateral bar cases in non-First Amendment con-
texts. See supra notes 12, 17-20 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
235. For example, it provides substantial protection to journalists to keep the names
of sources confidential, authority for which the court found in common law as well
as the federal and state constitutions. See State v. Rinaldo, 689 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1984)
(stating that journalists have a qualified common law privilege to withhold confiden-
pression and rejection of the collateral bar rule in two major cases, the
court nevertheless upheld a contempt conviction in a labor dispute
even while holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the
underlying order.' Washington's efforts to establish standards that
balance the power of courts and the rights protected by the First
Amendment demonstrate how difficult it is for even those states with
progressive records on freedom of speech and press issues to consis-
tently apply the collateral bar rule. The experience of Washington and
other states argue for national collateral bar rule standards in First
Amendment cases.
A year before Dickinson, in State ex rel. Superior Court v.
Sperry,"' the Washington Supreme Court strongly rejected the collat-
eral bar rule by holding that an unconstitutional order cannot support a
contempt conviction.' In Sperry, the trial court anticipated extensive
press coverage in a first-degree murder trial.' The judge entered an
order prohibiting news organizations from reporting on any proceedings
that took place outside the presence of the judge, jury, and interested
parties.' Shortly after the trial began, a motion to admit certain evi-
dence was made and an evidentiary hearing was held in open court
without a jury.2"
The morning after the hearing, the Seattle Times published a story
that included testimony from the hearing.m' Upon learning of the
newspaper's actions, the trial judge summoned the reporters before
him, barred them from attending the remainder of the trial, and ordered
tial information from a criminal defendant); Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641
P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1982) (holding that there is a common law qualified reporters' privi-
lege in civil cases and that the privilege extends to both working reporters and their
employees).
236. See Mead School District v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 530 P.2d 302 (Wash. 1975)
(hereinafter Mead I); Mead School District v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 534 P.2d 561 (Wash.
1975) (hereinafter Mead II).
237. 483 P.2d 608 (Wash. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
238. Id. at 613.
239. Id. at 609.
240. The court order provided:
No Court proceedings shall be reported upon or disseminated to the public
by any form of news media, including, but not limited to newspaper, maga-
zine, radio and television coverage, except those proceedings occurring in
open Court in the presence of the Judge, jury, court reporter, defendants,
and counsel for all parties. No report shall be made by such news media in
any event of matters of testimony ruled inadmissible or stricken by the trial
judge at the time of the offer of the matter or testimony.
Id.
241. Id. at 610.
242. Id. at 609-10.
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them to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for vio-
lating the court's order.'
The state argued, citing Walker v. City of Birmingham,' that the
newspaper should have challenged the order directly on appeal, by
motion to set aside, or by other immediate review.' The Washington
Supreme Court rejected the state's argument and distinguished Walk-
er.' First, the court found that the order was "transparently invalid,"
while the order challenged in WaLker was not void on its face. 7 Sec-
ond, the court noted that injunctions are frequently issued immediately
before the planned activity, leaving the enjoined party no opportunity to
directly attack the irjunction.' Finally, the court struck down the or-
der as an unconstitutional prior restraint. 9
The court then addressed the contempt citation. In a brief statement
the court concluded that the trial court's order was void and, therefore,
it could not support a contempt conviction.' Additionally, the court
stated that sustaining the contempt judgment would have implied that
the "mere possibility of prejudicial matter reaching a juror outside the
courtroom is more important" than the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of expression."
Sperry was undermined in a subsequent case, and the rule now may
243. Id. at 611.
244. 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967) (Petitioners violated an injunction prohibiting the en-
couragement of or participation in mass parades. The Court held that petitioners
could not attack the constitutionality of the injunction when appealing the contempt
order because they had not directly challenged the injunction).
245. Sperry, 483 P.2d at 611.
246.. Id.
247. Id. The court noted that "[wle have held in a number of cases that a void
order or decree, as distinguished from one that is merely erroneous, may be attacked
in a collateral proceeding. The violation of an order patently in excess of the juris-
diction of the issuing court cannot produce a valid judgment of contempt." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
248. Id. The court added- "The practical result then is that the enjoined party has
no adequate remedy at law and cannot engage in a lawful activity because of an
unconstitutional order. To us it seems unlikely that allowing collateral attack would
significantly reduce citizen compliance with lawful decrees . . . the citizen still faces
a substantial risk of criminal penalties if proved wrong in collateral, rather than di-
rect, attack on the decree's validity." Id.
249. Id. at 611-12. The court observed that if jurors failed to follow admonition
instructions telling them to consider only the evidence heard in court, and not to dis-
cuss the case with anyone, the proper remedy would be a new trial. Id. at 613.
250. Id.
251. Id.
be interpreted to mean that only orders affecting pure speech can be
collaterally challenged, while a contempt conviction may be upheld in
cases involving conduct, such as a labor dispute.'
The Mead School District brought an action to enjoin a strike by its
employees, members of the Mead Education Association.' The teach-
ers responded with a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action
was improperly authorized at a school board meeting held in violation
of the state's Open Public Meetings Act.' The court dismissed the
association's motion and later issued a temporary restraining order.'
The association subsequently violated the order and was cited for con-
tempt.m
In Mead I, the supreme court found the temporary injunction to be
unauthorized because the school board met illegally and its actions in
seeking the injunction were void. As a result, the court had no authority
to issue the order. 7 In Mead II, it considered whether the association
could be held in contempt for violating an order later determined to be
invalid.' The court found that once the injunction underlying a con-
tempt citation is held invalid, the status of the contempt citation is
determined by looking at whether the trial court had jurisdiction to
issue the erroneous injunction.'
The court in Mead H recognized that if it applied traditional jurisdic-
tional standards,' the contempt conviction would be reversed be-
cause the trial court technically lacked jurisdiction to issue the or-
der."' The court noted, however, that few cases have suffered from a
similar jurisdictional defect. The jurisdictional flaw rested in the
252. See supra note 9.
253. Mead I, 530 P.2d 302, 302-03 (Wash. 1975).
254. Id. at 304. The Act required the school board to give 24 hours notice before it
held a meeting.
255. Id.
256. The association was originally fred $1,000 which was later reduced on appeal
to $100. Mead II, 534 P.2d 561, 567 (Wash. 1975).
257. Mead I, 530 P.2d at 205.
258. Mead II, 534 P.2d at 561.
259. Id. at 563.
260. The court found two bases for jurisdiction. First, when the court has jurisdic-
tion over the parties and subject matter of the dispute and the court has legal au-
thority to issue the order. Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490, 495 (Wash. 1968); see also
State v. Olsen, 340 P.2d 171, 172 (Wash. 1959) (holding that test of court's jurisdic-
tion is whether it had power to inquire, not whether the outcome is right or wrong).
Second, a court has jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 292 (1947). Under this theory, a court has jurisdiction
because the most logical forum to decide jurisdiction is the trial court hearing the
case. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906).
261. Mead II, 534 P.2d at 563.
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plaintiff's lack of authority to sue, and not with the trial court.2" De-
spite the fact that there was no properly authorized case or controversy
before the trial court, the supreme court held that it had valid jurisdic-
tion over the parties and subject matter, and that "talismanic invocation
of the phrase 'lack of jurisdiction'... is not enough to vitiate a con-
tempt conviction."' The state supreme court reversed the convictions
against the individual association officers on self-incrimination grounds,
but upheld the contempt conviction against the union. The court based
its decision on the principle that the contempt citation was not de-
signed to benefit the plaintiff in the case, but was intended to vindicate
the court's power and to bolster respect for future court orders.'
The state's highest court reaffmned Sperry's rejection of the collater-
al bar rule in pure speech cases in State v. Coe,' holding that an or-
der "void on its face" cannot support a contempt conviction.2" The
trial court found a co-owned radio and television station in contempt
for broadcasting accurate and lawfully obtained copies of tape record-
ings that had been played in open court.'? The tapes contained con-
versations between the defendant and an undercover police officer. Coe
was accused of attempting to hire the officer to murder the prosecutor
and judge who previously tried and convicted her son.'s After the sta-
tion had legally obtained the tapes from the prosecutor, the trial judge
issued an order prohibiting the broadcast of the tapes because the de-
fense attorneys had presented evidence that their client's mental state
would be harmed by public dissemination of the conversations.'
Three days after the judge's order, the station broadcast portions of the
tapes during its newscast. The judge held the station in contempt and
fined it $2,000.27°
262. Id. at 565. In some respects this is similar to the "jurisdictional" defect in
United States v. Providence Journal in which the United States Supreme Court dis-
missed the writ of certiorari after it learned that the special prosecutor failed to ob-
tain written authorization from the attorney general. See supra note 1.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 567.
265. 679 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1984).
266. Id. at 358.
267. Id. at 356.
268. Id. at 355.
269. Id. at 355-56. The prosecutor agreed to provide the tapes to the station on the
condition that they not be aired until they were played in open court. The station
complied with this condition. Id. at 355.
270. Id. at 357. The judge observed that the "order was and is of honestly debat-
able constitutionality," but nevertheless held the station in contempt Id.
The supreme court concluded that the trial court order violated free
speech provisions of both the Federal and state constitutions," and
therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the order.' When a
court was not authorized to issue the order, it can be collaterally chal-
lenged in a contempt proceeding."s The contempt citation must be re-
versed, the court stated, because it cannot be based on an invalid or-
der.274 The court noted that the contrary approach taken in Walker and
Dickinson represented federal law concerning the rule,' and had pre-
viously been discredited in Sperry.'
Distinguishing Mead II presented a challenge. The court described
Mead II as providing a "jurisdiction" test which measures whether a
court, in issuing an order or holding in contempt those who defy it,
"was performing the sort of function for which judicial power was vest-
ed in it. If, but only if, it was not, its process is not entitled to the re-
271. The court held that the state constitution protected the fundamental rights of
its citizens and therefore, free speech rights are first to be tested under the state
rather than federal constitution. Id. at 359; see WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5, (providing
that. "[elvery person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being re-
sponsible for the abuse of that right"). The court added:
The language of the Washington Constitution absolutely forbids prior re-
straints against the publication or broadcast of constitutionally protected
speech under the facts of this (Coe) case, since the information sought to be
restrained was lawfully obtained, true, and a matter of public record by vir-
tue of having been previously admitted into evidence and presented in open
court.
Coe, 679 P.2d at 360. The court also reviewed the federal cases related to prior re-
straint in free press/fair trial contexts, and concluded that they support its holding that
the order was an unconstitutional prior restraint. Id. at 361-62. See Oklahoma Publish-
ing Co. v. District Ct., 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (explaining that the First Amendment does
not permit state court to prohibit publication of widely disseminated information ob-
tained at open court proceedings, even though involving juvenile a charged with a seri-
ous crime); Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that family of
rape and murder victim may not maintain privacy action against television station for
broadcasting name of the victim in violation of state law when legally obtained from
court records and accurately reported).
272. Coe, 679 P.2d. at 358. The court strongly suggested that prior restraint of pro-
tected speech is always unconstitutional. In cases involving unprotected speech, such
as obscenity, the court specifically stated that there is no absolute bar to prior re-
straints. Id. at 359-60. It also indicated that there are adequate and constitutionally
permissible methods available to trial courts to protect the -Sixth Amendment rights
of defendants. Id. at 364. In Coe, however, the issue was not her right to a fair trial,
but the harm the broadcast of the tapes would cause her mental health.
273. Id. at 357-58.
274. Id. at 358.
275. Coe was decided before In re Providence Journal Co., after which it can be
argued that federal law is divided over whether to apply the collateral bar rule in
First Amendment cases.
276. Id. at 358 n.3.
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spect due that of a lawful judicial body."2' The Coe court did not,
however, explain why the issuance of a void order meant a lack juris-
diction to have issued it when the Mead court held that even when no
case was technically before the trial court, it had "jurisdiction" to de-
cide jurisdiction, and the contempt penalty against the teachers associa-
tion was thus upheld.' The court largely ignored Mead and credited
Sperry as establishing the law in collateral bar rule cases involving the
First Amendment.'
B. ///inois
Support for the collateral bar rule assumes that judges issue orders in
good faith, and if they punish defiance of those orders by contempt,
they must believe in the validity of the orders. That argument is under-
mined by Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc.,'s where an Illinois ap-
pellate court reversed a contempt conviction imposed by a trial court
after the appellate court had already determined the order to be uncon-
stitutional.
The trial judge had ordered the publisher of the Rockford
Register-Star not to publish editorials related to a libel suit against the
newspaper." The newspaper published editorials in direct violation of
the order.2 2 The state appellate court subsequently held that the trial
court's restraining order was unconstitutionally overbroad and hn un-
just curtailment of free speech.' Following the appellate court's rul-
ing that the original order was unconstitutional, the trial court imposed
the contempt citation on the newspaper.2'
The Illinois appellate court noted that generally, an injunction must
be obeyed if the court issuing the order had personal and subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction
to issue the injunction.' The newspaper argued that the general rule
277. Id. at 357.
278. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
279. Coe, 679 P.2d at 357-58.
280. 365 N.E.2d 746 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977).
281. 339 N.E.2d 477 (MI. Ct. App. 1975). The trial court's dismissal of the libel ac-
tion was upheld. Rockford Newspapers, 365 N.E.2d at 746.
282. Rockford Newspapers, 365 N.E.2d at 749.
283. 339 N.E.2d at 482.
284. Rockford Newspapers, 365 N.E.2d at 747. The trial judge fined the newspaper
$2000 and the publisher $1000.
285. Id. at 748.
did not apply in this case because the trial court lacked authority to
issue a transparently invalid order that amounted to an unconstitutional
prior restraint.' The newspaper further claimed that because the trial
court lacked authority to issue the order, the validity of the original
order could be collaterally challenged in the contempt appeal. 7
The appellate court concluded that the order was not transparently
invalid under Nebraska Press Association because the Supreme Court
in that case did not hold that all prior restraint orders are forbidden
under the First Amendment.' It recognized that some states had per-
mitted collateral attack if the original order was issued in "excess of
jurisdiction," but concluded that the Illinois cases did not support a
similar defense.'
The first part of the opinion states classic collateral bar rule argu-
ments that one who disobeys a court order should not be permitted to
later challenge its validity. Nevertheless, the appellate court considered
the harm to the newspaper to be "irreparable," and implied that be-
cause the constitutional right involved is one with "ancient roots," the
violation may not be punishable by contempt if the order is proved
invalid.' . The court was convinced that Maness v. Meyers," where
the Supreme Court concluded that a lawyer could not be held in con-
tempt for advising his client to assert his Fifth-Amendment privilege
because the damage could not be undone, required reversal of the con-
tempt conviction in Cooper.
The court of appeals decided that there was no actual or imminent
interference with the administration of justice. The trial judge entered
the temporary injunction to prevent influencing potential jurors,M but
the appellate court concluded that there was no threat to the adminis-
tration of justice when the original order was wrongly issued, and thus,
there was no threat when the editorials were subsequently pub-
lished.' It also observed that timeliness is essential to news organiza-
tions which must be able to publish information about current
events.2 The court distinguished Walker as not applying to "pure
speech" where greater First Amendment protection applies, and noted
that to the extent that Dickinson "does not recognize the strong pre-





290. Id. at 749.
291. 419 U.S. 449, 460 (1976).
292. Rockford Newspapers, 365 N.E.2d at 750.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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irremedial nature of the injury inflicted by such an order.., we are not
persuaded by it."'
In an unusual twist that departed from the view expressed by some
courts, the Illinois appellate court permitted the newspaper greater
flexibility because it was not subject to an ex parte order. The Illinois
court noted that in Walker, the defendants disobeyed the order without
recourse to the courts. But in Cooper, the defendant newspaper "re-
spectfully argued to the trial court the constitutional issues which we
[the appellate court] found compelling on appeal before the alleged
disobedience." Some courts would argue that greater deference to
First Amendment interests should be given in those cases where there
was no opportunity to oppose the restraining order. Where, as here, the
news organization participated in a full hearing on the merits. prior to
the issuance of the order, the courts should not allow a collateral at-
tack once that order has been defied. 7 Such a result, it could be ar-
gued, encourages the losing party in an adversary proceeding to defy
the order and bring a collateral challenge.
The same Illinois appellate court that was so solicitous of First
Amendment interests in Cooper was much less tolerant in People v.
Sequoia Books.' Although the court partially invalidated an injunctioh
against a seller of sexually-explicit materials as an unconstitutional
prior restraint, it nevertheless upheld a jury, contempt conviction and
$10,000 fine for violating the order.'
The court distinguished Cooper as applying to speech protected by
the First Amendment, whereas in Sequoia, the injunction prohibited the
"distribution of obscenity, and obscenity is not within the area of con-
stitutionally protected speech or press."" The court, whose panel con-
sisted of none of the judges participating in Cooper, stated that respect
for court orders requires that Cooper and Providence Journal be "very
narrowly applied such that if a portion of an injunction is constitution-
ally valid and it is that portion which is violated a contempt finding
should stand."' Sequoia suggests that "low value" expression, such as
sexually-explicit material, will not enjoy the same First Amendment
295. Id. at 751.
296. Id.
297. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
298. 527 N.E.2d 50 (111. Ct. App. 1988).
299. Id. at 58.
300. Id. at 55 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
301. Id. at 57.
protection against the collateral bar rule as communication more close-
ly related to core First Amendment values.
C. Arizona
Two rulings demonstrate the difference conduct makes in collateral
bar cases. In Phoenix Newspapers v. Superior Court,' the Arizona
Supreme Court held that an invalid order against news organizations
seeking to limit coverage of a pretrial hearing in a murder case could
not support a contempt conviction.' After the newspaper published a
factual account of a habeas corpus hearing held the day before the jury
was impaneled, the court directed the reporters to appear to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt for violating the or-
der.'
The state supreme court overturned the order. The court observed
that it "strikes at the very foundation of freedom of the press by sub-
jecting it to censorship by the judiciary." And it further noted that
"[wihat transpires in the courtroom is public property."' The court
concluded that an order restraining the press from publishing accurate
and truthful information obtained in open court was void and cannot
support a contempt conviction.3
Phoenix Newspapers, involving pure speech, did not protect labor
demonstrators in State v. Chavez.' The Arizona Court of Appeals
held that the defendants, who were members of the United Farm Work-
ers Union, could not collaterally attack an injunction prohibiting them
302. 418 P.2d 594 (Ariz. 1966).
303. Id. at 595-96.
304. The judge's order, issued orally, noted that the defendant was going to be tried
for homicide and the county attorney was seeking the death penalty. With jury selec-
tion to begin shortly, the judge did not want any coverage of the habeas corpus
hearing. The judge further stated that "if it is published that I found probable
cause . . . it would be tantamount to everybody reading the 'paper to believe that he
is already guilty." Id. at 595.
305. Id at 596.
306. Id. The Arkansas Supreme Court relied on Phoenix Newspapers in allowing a
newspaper editor to collaterally challenge a prior restraint order in Wood v. Goodson,
485 S.W.2d 213 (Ark. 1972). A state judge had ordered the newspaper not to publish
a verdict delivered in open court in a criminal trial while a related trial was pending.
After disobeying the court order, the editor was fined $250 and sentenced to 60 days
in jail, both of which were suspended pending appeal. Id. at 214. Quoting extensively
from Phoenix Newspapers about the public nature of trials, the Arkansas Supreme
Court concluded that "no court has the power to prohibit the news media from pub-
lishing what transpires in open court," and, therefore, "the order not to publish was
void and subject to collateral attack." Id. at 217.
307. 601 P.2d 301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
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from demonstrating once they disobeyed the court order." Unlike
other collateral bar cases where an appellate court first determines the
validity of the underlying order, the Arizona Court of Appeals refused to
consider the constitutionality of the order prohibiting the union from
demonstrating." The court rejected the argument that just because
the First Amendment is involved, one can disobey a court order.1
When there have been acts of violence, a court may well enjoin further
picketing. The court stated that the "basic liberties of the First Amend-




Two years after Phoenix Newspapers and a year after Walker, the
California Supreme Court held in In re Berry 12 that public employees
could collaterally challenge an injunction seeking to prevent them from
picketing and encouraging non-union employees to participate in a
strike." The petitioners disobeyed the court order, then sought re-
lease from a contempt proceeding by filing a habeas corpus petition.1 4
The state supreme court rejected the argument that the employees
were precluded from challenging the original order while appealing the
contempt conviction, noting that "it is clearly the law that the violation
of an order in excess of jurisdiction of the issuing court cannot produce
a valid judgment of contempt.""5 The California Supreme Court quick-
ly dismissed Walker by concluding that the Supreme Court only held
that the collateral bar rule as applied in that case did not violate the
Constitution, and that states could still enact broader standards in this
308. Id. at 302.
309. Id.
310. The court concluded that the "concept that any person, lay or professional,
may determine whether a court order is 'void on its face' and thus susceptible to
being ignored as unconstitutional can find no justification in the. law. The application
of such a principle would stand the judicial system in this country on its head." Id.
at 306.
311. Id. The Arizona court criticized California for permitting a collateral challenge
in a labor picketing case, In re Berry, 436 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1968), and suggested that
the Washington Supreme Court should have followed Walker in its Sperry decision.
Id. at 302, 305.
312. 436 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1968).
313. Id. at 279.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 280 (citing Fortenbury v. Superior Ct., 106 P.2d 411, 412 (Cal. 1940)).
area."16 The court held that its rule was "considerably more consistent
with the exercise of First Amendment freedoms than that adopted in
Alabama, and it is therefore difficult to perceive how the Walker deci-
sion is of relevance.""7 The court assumed that punishment of the al-
leged contemnor who miscalculates the validity of the underlying order
sufficiently protects judicial authority."1 8
E. Texas
In Ex parte Tucci,319 the Texas Supreme Court found that under its
own constitution, anti-abortion demonstrators convicted of civil con-
tempt for violating a temporary restraining order may collaterally chal-
lenge the validity of the original order."2 The court recognized that
"speech delayed often translates into speech denied,"" and it strongly
rejected the federal collateral bar rule in Walker as controlling.' 2
The court sharply criticized the dissenting justices' refusal to review
the constitutionality of the underlying order because the case involved
civil contempt, and it further held that the "exceptions" stated in Provi-
dence and other cases that "transparently invalid" orders can be dis-
obeyed are only a "mirage."3
316. Id. at 282.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 281. The court added that the contemnor
may conclude that the exigencies of the situation or the magnitude of the
rights involved render immediate action worth the cost of peril . . . such a
person, under California law, may disobey the order and raise his jurisdiction-
al contentions when he is sought to be punished for such disobedience. If he
has correctly assessed his legal position, and It is ... determined that the
order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, his violation of such a
void order constitutes no punishable wrong.
Id. at 281; see also Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10, 18 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (finding a
federal habeas corpus proceeding that prohibited activity protected by the First
Amendment unconstitutional and the "contempt judgment based on petitioners' sup-
posed violation of the injunction [as] impermissible").
319. 859 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1993).
320. Id. at 2. Anti-abortion demonstrators protested outside a family planning clinic,
violating a temporary restraining order which created a 100-foot zone around the
clinic to protect clients' access. Id. at 3. Although the restraining order sought to
prevent abusive and harassing behavior, as weli as other activities, the protesters
were held in contempt only for demonstrating within 100 feet of the clinic. Id. at 4.
321. Id. at 2.
322. Id. Petitioners brought an original habeas corpus proceeding under art. 1, sec.
8 of the Texas Constitution which states in part- "Every person shall be at liberty to
speak, write, or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for abuse of
that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of
the press." Id. at 5 n.8.
323. Id. Applying strict scrutiny, the court found that the order was not the "least
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The dissent suggested that a collateral challenge may be appropriate
when "an appeal of an order restricting expression cannot be timely
prosecuted. " ' But the court majority concluded that judges should
not be "elevated to censors required to examine the content of speech
to determine whether or not the message could wait a week, two
weeks, a month or years until an appeal is prosecuted." 5 The
majority's strong endorsement of First Amendment interests suggested
that even expressive conduct, which may include the blocking of access
to planning clinics as well as intimidation of those seeking clinic servic-
es, enjoys the same protection against the harsh effects of the collateral
bar rule as pure speech.'
F. Massachusetts
In Fitchburg v. 707 Main Corp.,"7 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reversed the conviction of a movie theater owner that
was based on his violation of a licensing law later declared invalid on
appeal.' The appellate court ruled that the ordinance requiring movie
theaters to be licensed was arbitrarily and capriciously applied, lacked
objective standards, and was unconstitutionally vague.m
The court found that the type of contempt under which petitioner
was convicted was ambiguous, stating that the facts in the record
"could have provided a basis for either a criminal contempt proceeding
or a civil contempt proceeding. " ' ° Despite the confusion, it found no
restrictive means" of protecting access to family planning clinics and violated the
Texas Constitution's guarantee of free speech. Id. at 7.
324. Id. at 3.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 8. The court concluded:
Today our court continues to favor the growth and enhancement of freedom
not its constraint. The fact that vigorous debate of public issues in our soci-
ety may produce speech considered obnoxious or offensive by some is a
necessary cost of that freedom. Our Constitution calls on this court to
maintain a commitment to expression that is strong and uncompromising for
friend and foe alike.
Id.
327. 343 N.E.2d 149 (1976).
328. Id. at 151. The trial court had fined the defendant $500 a day for a period of
two weeks, sentenced him to six months in jail, then fined him an additional $15,000.
Id. at 152.
329. Id. at 153-54.
330. Id. at 154.
prejudice resulting from the ambiguity and chose not to remand to the
trial court the issue of whether criminal contempt punishment is still
appropriate which would "vindicate the court's authority."" It con-
cluded that although the order was not transparently invalid, the con-
tempt conviction must be reversed.'
G. Alabama
Considering that Walker emerged from Alabama courts, it is not sur-
prising that the state's highest court upheld the collateral bar rule. In
Ex parte Purvis,r the defendant, a union leader, was jailed for con-
tempt after violating a temporary restraining order enjoining a strike
against the Birmingham water department.' The court held that the
defendant could not challenge the constitutional validity of the trial
court's order because he made no effort to have the order modified or
dissolved before violating it.'
In rejecting the defendant's contention that the order interfered with
his First Amendment rights and was therefore void on its face, the state
supreme court justified the order by noting that violence had erupted
during the union strike causing a threat to the city's continuation of
water service."a The trial court's order was not, therefore, transparent-
ly invalid or frivolous.' The court also observed that the trial judge
had scheduled a hearing within five days after issuance of the order, at
which time the defendant could have sought modification or dissolution
of the order." The court concluded that it need not consider the va-
lidity of the underlying order because the "[s]ole basis for our decision
in this case is the need to maintain the integrity of court orders."'
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. 382 So. 2d 512 (Ala. 1980).
334. Id. at 514.
335. Id. at 515. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 15 days in jail, and he
served eight days before the state supreme court stayed the sentence pending appeal.
Id. at 513.
336. Id. at 515.
337. Id.
338. Id. The court differentiated between cases in which orders are issued against
the press in criminal trials and those in which the state has a compelling interest in
regulating the use of streets and other public places. Id, at 514-15.
339. Id. at 515. See Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. Doe, 220 S.E.2d 672, 682 (W. Va.
1975) (upholding criminal contempt convictions of union leaders violating a restrain-
ing order against picketing). In Doe, the court allowed a limited exception to the
collateral bar rule when someone can prove "that the injunction was not issued in
good faith and that the legal process was being used as a vehicle for intimidation."
Id. at 680.
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V. ESTABLISHING NATIONAL COUATERAL BAR RULE STANDARDS IN
FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
A. State-by-State Adjudication
How much protection those exercising First Amendment rights enjoy
from the effects of the collateral bar rule varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Because a number of states have held that an unconstitu-
tional order cannot support a contempt conviction, and few jurisdic-
tions have directly upheld the rule in First Amendment cases, it is
tempting for those supportive of free expression rights to allow
state-by-state development to continue. It could be argued that in the
future, if too many states fail to provide sufficient deference to the First
Amendment by prohibiting collateral challenges to unconstitutional
orders, the Supreme Court may react by establishing protective national
standards.
Leaving the states to develop their own standards, and assuming that
the Supreme Court will step in if those standards are insufficiently
protective of the First Amendment, is risky for a number of reasons.
First, the Supreme Court may grant certiorari in a case with an unrepre-
sentative set of circumstances in which First Amendment interests are
difficult to uphold.' Second, it may reaffirm Walker and either require
or strongly encourage federal courts not to permit collateral challenges
when no effort to appeal or modify the order was made.
Third, it may lay down specific rules for federal courts while permit-
ting states flexibility to allow collateral challenges if they choose. But if
states know that extending First Amendment protection is not required
by the Supreme Court, they may be less likely to do so especially if it
means curtailing judicial authority. Moreover, if the Supreme Court
337. A classic example of an unrepresentative case going to the Supreme Court to
test an important First Amendment principle was Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), where the Supreme Court held that reporters do not enjoy a privilege to keep
confidential the names of sources when they have actually witnessed a crime and
have been called before a grand jury. Id. at 667. Most of the time reporters do not
witness crimes but relay events told to them by others. That made Branzburg a poor
case for deciding the privilege, which the Supreme Court rejected in a five to four
decision. Id. at 665. However, because of Justice Powell's concurrence that suggested
such a privilege should exist under appropriate circumstances, some courts have
adopted the three-part test included in Justice Stewart's dissent which makes forced
disclosure of confidential sources extremely difficult. See Kaker v. F & F Inv., 470
F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972) (affirming decision not to require a reporter to disclose
his journalistic sources).
established standards protective of judicial authority for the federal
courts, many state courts would find those standards difficult to resist.
The result would be the adoption of principles less protective of the
First Amendment than would have been the case if the Supreme Court
had remained silent on the issue.
Fourth, the Supreme Court could attempt to distinguish "pure
speech" from "speech plus conduct" and permit the collateral bar rule
in the latter but not the former. As the "flag burning" and other cases
have demonstrated, however, this is a difficult road to travel and the
Court has often been unsuccessful in separating speech and conduct
elements.'
Furthermore, state-by-state development does not necessarily further
First Amendment interests in an era of national news dissemination.
Major news organizations, which can be sued in almost any jurisdiction
where their news product is distributed, are subjected to widely varying
First Amendment standards.' Plaintiffs, although not always success-
ful, frequently forum shop for the most hostile First Amendment envi-
ronment, and juries and appellate courts are more than willing to re-
ward those efforts with substantial damage awards.0
The best approach is for the Supreme Court to establish minimum
338. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (holding the Flag Protection
Act of 1989 unconstitutional); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag
burning is expressive conduct and, therefore, protected by the First Amendment); see
O'Brien v. United States, 391. U.S. 367 (1968), In which the Court developed a
"mid-level" scrutiny test for statutes that purport to regulate conduct, but which have
an incidental or direct effect on speech.
339. There are certain states, for example, where juries award huge libel damages
against media defendants, and appellate courts, largely ignoring Supreme
Court-mandated protections such as actual malice In public official and public figure
cases, uphold those judgments. Pennsylvania, for example, is one of the most hostile
environments for media defendants in defamation suits. See Albert Scardino, Newspa-
per Pays Big Libel Award, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1989, at A13 (awarding a former
judge $2.8 million who was defamed in a newspaper article). A jury in Waco, Texas
awarded a huge sum to a former district attorney in his libel suit against a Dallas TV
station. $58 Million Awarded in Biggest Libel Verdict, N.Y. TimES, Apr. 21, 1991, at
19. The television station settled for a reported $20 million. Kim Cobb, Attorney Con-
sidered by Turner Gains Prestige in Libel Lawsuits, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 10, 1992, at
All. See also James A. Hemphill, Note, Libel-Proof Plaintiffs and the Question of
lNury, 71 TEX. L. REV. 401 (1992) (arguing that libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is well
established in basic tort law principles).
340. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984), the Court held that the
plaintiff, a resident of New York, could sue the magazine, an Ohio corporation, in
New Hampshire federal court because, "[flalse statements of fact harm both the sub-
ject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement. New Hampshire may rightly
employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its citizens." Id. at 776. Keeton
chose New Hampshire because of its six-year statute of limitations on defamation
actions. It had expired everywhere else. Id. at 773.
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standards which the lower courts must meet, while granting them the
flexibility to extend First Amendment protection beyond those stan-
dards." This is the approach the Court has taken in defamation cases
and other areas of the law.342 It would preserve the autonomy that
courts need to enforce their orders, and at the same time, provide na-
tional standards in First Amendment cases that all courts must meet.
The First Amendment's special role in a democratic society requires
that state and federal courts be permitted to extend the minimum stan-
dards only in the direction of providing more protection for free expres-
sion, and not less. Those states that adopt standards that are more
protective of speech than the Supreme Court's approach would have
two choices. First, they can base the holding on their own state consti-
tutions, thus largely insulating the decisions from later federal court re-
view.3" Second, they can choose to rest their holdings on First
Amendment grounds, and assert that they are extending those holdings
to more favorably accommodate free expression interests."
B. Minimum Procedural Standards
The U.S. Supreme Court must eventually establish procedural and
substantive standards for collateral bar cases involving the First Amend-
ment. On the procedural side, the Court should require that if the trial
court's order is issued ex parte, the news organization or other speaker
must be allowed to disobey the order and collaterally challenge it in the
contempt appeal.3" It is unfair for those subject to an order issued at
341. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding that
states may adopt more expansive First Amendment protection under their own consti-
tutions even though the Supreme Court would not make such a ruling under the Fed-
eral Constitution).
342. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that as long as states do
not allow liability without fault, they may choose for themselves the standard of lia-
bility in private person defamation suits). Under Gertz, states may require more
press-protective standards in defamation cases. Id. at 350. New York, for example,
chose "gross negligence"-a standard between mere negligence and actual malice-in
cases involving privates persons involved in matters of legitimate public concern.
Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571 (N.Y. 1975).
343. For a list of the freedom of expression provisions of all state constitutions, see
Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 37-38 (Tex. 1993).
344. Id.
345. In Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), the order was issued ex
parte. Id. at 309. A year later, the Supreme Court limited ex parte injunctions re-
straining a planned demonstration to those circumstances in which it is virtually im-
a hearing in which they were not heard to be required to obey the or-
der or face contempt.m The First Amendment requires that at a mini-
mum, those who are to be enoined be represented before the order is
issued. 7
In its capacity as the administrative head of the federal system, the
Supreme Court could require appellate courts to provide emergency
procedures for cases dealing with First Amendment interests. Too often
in prior restraint cases, many months elapsed between the time of the
order and the appellate decision. By the time the appellate ruling was
handed down, the news value of the event had long passed, and the
appellate decision did not provide relief to the media organization.
The Supreme Court must also end the special reverence it grants to
court orders that do little more than incorporate unconstitutional stat-
utes, but which must nevertheless be obeyed. When a void statute is
transformed into a void court order, the petitioners must be able to
disobey the order and challenge it in a contempt proceeding. '
The Supreme Court should continue to clarify the difference between
civil and criminal contempt. In Bagwell, the Court found that lower
courts still characterize serious criminal contempt penalties as civil
either because they are misinformed, or they do not want to provide
criminal procedures to those held in contempt.". The Supreme Court's
historical treatment of civil and criminal contempt has provided rela-
possible to have notified petitioners and provide them an opportunity to be heard.
Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 185 (1968). The Court stated:
There is a place in our jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without notice,
of temporary restraining orders of short duration; but there is no place with-
in the area of basic freedoms guaranteed by the .First Amendment for such
orders where no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or to notify
the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to participate.
Id. at 180.
346. See CBS Order, 497 U.S. at 102. The Supreme Court should also require that
any restraining order against First Amendment interests be in writing so that there
will not be factual disputes as to the content of the order when an appeal is taken.
See id.
347. It is possible that once a judge has determined that there is the potential of
irreparable harm and the "status quo" must be preserved while a hearing is sched-
uled, nothing that the media organization's attorney will say before the trial judge
will convince the court not to issue the order. Nevertheless, counsel for demonstra-
tors or media organizations may be successful in limiting the scope or duration of
the temporary restraining order, and may establish a more complete record for emer-
gency appeal.
348. See supra note 6.
349. International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994);
see also Edward L Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Media's Dissemination of Material in
Violation of Injunction or Restraining Order As Contempt - Federal Cases, 91 A.LR.
FED 270 (1989).
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tively clear rules that lower courts should have followed. The presump-
tion should be to provide procedural rights before imposing contempt
penalties even if there are both civil and criminal elements involved.
This is especially true when First Amendment interests are at stake.
The Supreme Court should also discourage lower courts from using
"jurisdictional defects" to justify rejection of the collateral bar rule
unless there is a genuine issue as to subject matter or personal jurisdic-
tion." It is confusing when an appellate court determines an order
was void because the trial court lacked "jurisdiction" to issue it when
the lower court clearly had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. Appellate courts apparently are comfortable with the fiction
that a lower court's order may be disobeyed if that court lacked juris-
diction to order it. The fiction suggests that because the lower court
lacked jurisdiction, there was no actual order, and therefore, there was
no defiance of the court's authority that must be vindicated in a crimi-
nal contempt proceeding. The Supreme Court should require that lower
courts abandon this fiction and candidly admit that they allow defiance
of seemingly void or unconstitutional orders if First Amendment inter-
ests are involved.
In those cases where an appellate court has concluded that a trial
court order is unconstitutional before a contempt citation has been
imposed, or when an appellate court vacates a contempt judgment be-
cause of the invalidity of the lower court order and remands for further
action,31 the Supreme Court should not permit a contempt conviction.
The argument that court orders must be obeyed because no one knows
in advance whether it will be upheld on appeal is undermined when an
appellate court has already overturned the order. Under those circum-
stances, allowing the trial court to reimpose a contempt citation is an
abuse of judicial power.
C. Minimum Substantive Standards
The Supreme Court must bring contempt into the modem judicial
era. The power of trial courts to summarily impose serious contempt
penalties, such as those which carry a sentence of up to six months in
jail and a potentially large fme, 2 places too much power in the hands
of an individual judge. Judges must be able to control proceedings be-
350. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 4.
352. See supra note 26.
fore them by dealing with contemptuous behavior that disrupts court-
room decorum. Once the trial is over, however, there is little reason for
not providing a hearing before a different judge and when appropriate,
a jury.
The historical justification for allowing summary judgment is that no
fact-finding is required because the judge witnessed the contemptuous
conduct, and appellate courts should not restrict the authority of trial
judges to deal swiftly and aggressively with misbehavior in their pres-
ence. As noted by the Fifth Circuit in Dickinson, direct criminal con-
tempt is perhaps the. last vestige of "common-law crimes" in this coun-
try.m To allow the judge who may be the target of the contemptuous
behavior to sit as grand jury, prosecutor, witness, trial jury, and sen-
tencing judge, sometimes within a matter of minutes, raises serious
questions of unfairness or bias.' 4 It makes little sense to require pro-
-cedural protections in the prosecution of indirect criminal contempt
while allowing few procedural rights beyond a "show cause" hearing in
cases of direct criminal contempt.
VI. A FIRST AMENDMENT LIMIT TO THE COLLATERAL BAR RULE
Despite some notable exceptions, the Supreme Court has traditionally
provided substantial protection to free expression interests.m The
Court permits prior restraint orders in extremely limited circumstanc-
es;m it grants media defendants an arsenal of weapons in defamation
cases involving public officials and public figures, and considerable
protection in cases involving private persons;'? certain invasion of pri-
vacy suits against media defendants are hard to win because the Court
extended the "actual malice" standard from defamation to false-light
invasion of privacy plaintiffs;'m it generally allows states to extend,
but not restrict, First Amendment rights based on their own
constitutions;' it has established a test for obscene materials that is
extremely difficult to meet;'m it requires that advocacy of radical ideas
be closely linked to violence before such speech can be punished." In
353. See supra note 3.
354. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 30-31 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 30.
357. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Even private persons must prove
actual malice before they can collect punitive damages in a defamation suit. See
Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
358. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
359. See supra note 49.
360. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
361. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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short, the Court has mostly preserved the "preferred position" of the
First Amendment.
The essential role that the First Amendment plays in a democratic
society provides ample justification for special treatment in collateral
bar rule cases. Except under limited circumstances, courts should not
impose the rule in cases related to central principles of the First
Amendment. Providing this protection does not undermine the legitima-
cy of courts. If the order is ultimately upheld on appeal, the contempt
citation stands and the court's authority is vindicated. Whether chal-
lenge to the order comes from direct or collateral appeal does not
make a substantial difference in the ability of courts to function, yet it
may determine whether First Amendment rights are unfairly forfeited,
especially when there is little time before a deadline for the expressive
activity.
Deviations from this special treatment should be limited to those rare
circumstances when a temporary restraining order or injunction is re-
quired to prevent imminent violence, significant destruction of property,
or interference with essential public services. That would exclude from
the exceptions all cases of "pure speech," and would permit collateral
challenges involving news organizations and others who disseminate
information by print or broadcast. In cases where there is speech and
conduct, and the conduct must be enjoined to prevent dire consequenc-
es, such orders should be obeyed if the courts have subject matter and
personal jurisdiction, and direct, not collateral, appeal should be
sought.
The consequences of violent or destructive behavior cannot be "re-
versed" when an appellate court eventually decides the validity of the
original order. Unlike a prior restraint order which a judge should know
is likely to be reversed under Nebraska Press Association,' a judge
may not know whether activities by demonstrators or picketers will
result in violence.
This "violence" exception must be narrowly applied, and would not
have covered the demonstrations in Walker. The threshold showing of
potential serious violence must be extremely high. In Walker, the court
appended a clearly unconstitutional ordinance to an ex parte order
enjoining peaceful demonstrations.' Such an order is entitled to no
respect.
362. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
363. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
Where ongoing violent demonstrations are enjoined, the courts
should enforce the collateral bar rule. If the court has already seen a
pattern of violent behavior by those exercising First Amendment rights
or by those viewing the demonstrations, it should enjoin further vio-
lence, and the court's order should be obeyed and challenged on direct
appeal. The court should not attempt to weigh how much of the activity
is speech and how much is conduct, providing First Amendment protec-
tion to the former and limited protection to the latter. It should look at
whether violence has already taken place, or whether the evidence of
potential violence is clear and convincing.
Disruptions of essential public services are unlikely to directly impli-
cate First Amendment interests. If police officers or fire fighters are
about to strike, or a city's water system is threatened by a work stop-
page or walkout,' a court order enjoining such activities should be
obeyed and not collaterally challenged. Picketing and other
labor-related activities clearly implicate First Amendment rights, and the
enjoining of such activities have been abused by the courts.' Never-
theless, the harm that would result from the disobedience of such or-
ders requires that courts be able to impose contempt penalties even if
the order is later invalidated.
Imposing the collateral bar rule in First Amendment cases forces
those who may lack sufficient resources to pursue what could be a long
and prohibitively expensive appellate process. Those who do not have
the money of a large media organization would find the safer course to
be compliance with the judicial order no matter how likely it is to be
overturned. Such.orders may never be tested if there is compliance and
no appeal.
The harm resulting from such interference with legitimate First
Amendment rights is magnified when the rights of readers, viewers and
listeners are considered. Traditional First Amendment jurisprudence has
focused on the speaker. Nevertheless, the right to receive information
has enjoyed increasing attention by the courts.' When those subject
to invalid orders are prevented from disseminating information, the
public is also deprived of information it may need to make political,
economic, and other important decisions. When courts issue orders
telling a news organization not to publish or broadcast information,
they are also telling the readers, listeners and viewers that they are not
entitled to receive it.
Those subject to an order limiting their First Amendment rights
364. See, e.g., Ex parte Purvis, 382 So. 2d 512 (Ala. 1980).
365. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 46.
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should make a reasonable effort to have it modified or vacated on ap-
peal before disobeying it. The legitimacy of courts as a co-equal branch
of government requires such deference. But if an invalid order inter-
feres with free expression rights, and the appeal cannot be made or be
heard before circumstances require public dissemination, those subject
to the order must be able to challenge it while appealing the contempt
conviction. Such a collateral challenge is essential if First Amendment
rights are to be preserved, and it shows no more disrespect for the law
than does an invalid court order restricting freedom of speech and
press.

